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Harmonization Through Condemnation:
Is New London the Key to World Patent
Harmony?
Max Stul Oppenheimer*

ABSTRACT

Since 1790, when two U.S. patent applicants have claimed
the same invention, the patent has been awarded to the first
inventor. Today, the United States stands alone in the
industrialized world, and many argue that the United States
should, in the interest of world patent harmony, change its
system so as to award a contested patent to the first applicant.
Of the arguments advanced to justify the change, the only ones
that withstand scrutiny are that "all the other countries are
doing it" and the hope that some concessions in other aspects of
intellectual property or trade might be obtained in exchange.
There are compelling reasons to resist the change, principally
that (unless other fundamental aspects of U.S. patent law are
changed as well) U.S. inventors will be disadvantaged.
Even if the arguments favoring the change are found to
outweigh the arguments favoring the status quo, the power to
grant U.S. patents derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
(the Intellectual Property Clause) of the Constitution, which
authorizes granting exclusive rights to authors and inventors.
Other countries are not so constrained. An historical analysis of
the Intellectual Property Clause and review of the types of
evidence used by the Supreme Court in constitutional analysis
lead to the conclusion that the Intellectual Property Clause does
not permit granting patents to the first applicant in preference
to the first inventor.
Alternate sources of Congressional power have been
suggested (principally the Commerce Clause and the Treaty
Power), but the Supreme Court has never found either sufficient
to overcome a specific constitutional limitation of power. The
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only power which seems sufficient to accomplish the objective of
harmonization within constitutional limits is eminent domain.
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I. THE PROPOSAL TO HARMONIZE PATENT LAWS

Harmonization is usually good 1 if the result is that everyone does
things your way. Harmonization is more complicated if it requires
conforming behavior to someone else's norms. This latter case
requires two analyses: one of the costs and benefits of the proposed
change, and one of whether the proposed change violates some
fundamental principle that overrides an otherwise favorable
cost/benefit analysis. A recurrent proposal to harmonize world patent
laws presents both questions for the United States.
A. Patent Theory and the First-to-File Movement

Patents are limited monopolies granted by most countries to
encourage innovation. 2 In the United States, patents are contrary to
general principles favoring competition and therefore are granted
only if they meet statutory requirements designed to assure that the
public receives a valuable contribution in return:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private
benefit .... [They are] intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors ... and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. 3

Once such access has been achieved through one disclosure, there is
no need to provide incentives for a second disclosure. 4 Although the
Constitution does not explicitly limit the grant to one patent per

1.
While it is tempting to assume that harmonization is good per se, it is easy
to cite cases where it is not; in 1789, harmonization might have led the Constitutional
Convention to choose monarchy.
2.
In the United States, the justification for granting patents (as well as
copyrights) is found in Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight of the Constitution, which
provides "Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
3.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). While Sony
involved alleged infringement of copyrights, the copyright and patent laws find
authority in the same clause of the Constitution and the Sony analysis borrows heavily
from patent law.
4.
For example, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a "trade secret" as:

[I]nformation . . . that: (i) Derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use; and (ii) Is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985). Publication of a patent would destroy any trade
secret contained in the specification by making it generally known; allowing
publication would also destroy the trade secret as a failure to make reasonable efforts
to maintain its secrecy.
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invention, the Supreme Court has held that a patent may not
withdraw technology from the public domain. 5 It follows that in the
United States it would be unconstitutional (and even absent the
constitutional constraint, undesirable) to grant more than one patent
per invention. 6
In the great majority of U.S. cases, this principle of no more than
one patent per invention is applied in the context of deciding
patentability. If the claimed invention already appears in the prior
art, 7 or is an obvious extension of the prior art, 8 there is no need to
grant the patent because the public already has access to the

5.
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989), held that
Congress cannot remove information from the public domain because removal would
thwart the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts.
There is no public domain clause in the Copyright Clause, and absent the
requirement that patents "promote the Progress of ... useful Arts," there is no
textual reason why Congress today could not grant a patent to an Inventor for
his "Discovery" just because that discovery has already passed into the public
domain .... Yet as this Court has held, in light of the "limitations" built into
the clause, "monopolies" are not permitted under the Copyright Clause when
there is no "concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."'
Br. for Pet'r at 21, Eldred v. Reno, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (quoting Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.
at 146).
6.
There are circumstances in which no patent would be available for an
invention such as if the invention were not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2006); if the invention were already in the public domain but unpatented
(prohibited in the U.S. by 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03); or if the applicant violated a rule (35
U.S. C. §§ 101-03). In the United States, examples of violating a rule would include
creating a statutory bar by publishing an enabling description or offering an
embodiment of the invention for sale more than a year prior to filing an application (35
U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103); failing to respond to an office action within the permitted time
(35 U.S. C. § 133); or failing to disclose relevant information during prosecution of the
application (Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949)).
7.
"Prior art" refers to information which is relevant to a determination of
patentability. If the technology claimed in a patent application is already in the prior
art, the application would fail under both 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter ... may obtain a patent therefor") and 35 U.S.C. § 102 ("A person shall be
entitled to a patent unless-(a) the invention was known or used by others in this
country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public
use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States....").
8.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 ... if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. 103(a).
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information. Occasionally, however, there are circumstances in
which the claimed invention is not in the prior art, but there are
multiple claimants to the patent. 9 For example, if the prior art is
interpreted to include only the domestic technology base, then a
traveler who observes someone else's invention in a foreign country
and is the first to bring news of the invention back home would be
adding to the technology base. If several travelers each brought the
same technology home, it would be logical and fair to award a patent
to the first to file an application. 10 In this case, the contribution to
the public is not the invention of the technology but its local
dissemination. If the actual (foreign) inventor were then to travel to
the domestic country and file a patent application, a different
problem would arise: there would be a conflict between the first filer
and the true inventor. Early patent systems and cases must be
viewed in the context of the communications and transportation
systems of the times, and care must be taken in applying them to
modern day circumstances. 11
Derivation is another circumstance in which there might be
multiple claimants. The true inventor might choose not to file a
patent application. 12 Another individual might learn of the invention
from the actual inventor and file a patent application. If the true

9.
The most recent available U.S. Patent Office statistics (for 2001) indicate
that less than 0.05% of patent applications involve multiple claimants to the same
invention. See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Patent Statistics Report,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taflreports_stco.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
In that year there were 345,732 applications and about 136 interferences were
declared between applications claiming the same invention. Id. Interferences are
reported on a fiscal year basis: there were 136 in fiscal 2000 and 124 in fiscal 2001. Id.
It may be objected that it takes time for an interference to be declared, so the
comparison should be between 2001 interferences and an earlier year's applications.
Even going back to 1998, the incidence would still be only slightly above 0.05%
(260,889 applications). Id.
10.
A patent granted to one who observes the technology abroad but is the first
to introduce it domestically is referred to as a patent of importation. While recognized
in seventeenth century England, they were rejected in early U.S. decisions. See, e.g.,
Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804); Woodcock v. Parker, 30 F. Cas.
491 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813).
For good reason, most eighteenth century systems followed the rule of
11.
considering only the domestic technology base. Before rapid communications, the
internet, and common international travel, it was likely that technology from other
countries would elude the domestic technology base. There may well be advanced
technology on other planets, but it is not considered prior art under U.S. (or any other)
patent law. If, in the future, it becomes common to communicate with or travel to
extraterrestrial civilizations, their technology would become part of the prior art under
current statutes as written.
12.
There are many reasons an inventor might make this choice, including
ignorance of the patent system, lack of funds, failure to appreciate the true value of the
invention, or a conscious decision to forego patent protection (which only lasts a
maximum of twenty years) to maintain trade secret protection (which in theory could
last forever).
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inventor then filed a patent application, a conflict similar to the
"patent of importation" scenario arises. However, here the result
might logically depend on the motives of the "true" inventor. Sound
policy might deny a government-sanctioned monopoly to a true
inventor who had no intention of placing the technology in the public
domain until after someone else had done so.13
The final scenario in which there might be multiple claimants to
a patent on the same invention is multiple independent invention by
individuals who, unaware of the others' work, independently make
the same invention. Here, each might be considered an "inventor" in
the sense that the technological advance was made in ignorance of its
previous discovery by another "inventor." To maintain the principle
that only one patent may be granted for each invention, a choice must
be made between individuals, each of whom is acting in good faith
and following exactly the path the patent system wants: filing a
patent application and surrendering a trade secret.
It is this last scenario that poses the problem for those who seek
international harmonization of patent laws. Two systems would
logically further the goal of granting only one patent per invention: a
first-to-invent system of awarding patents to the first inventor,
thereby rewarding innovation, or a first-to-file system awarding
. patents to the first person to disclose the invention to the government
by filing a patent application, thereby rewarding promptly putting
the invention in the domain of public knowledge. 14 In the vast
majority of cases, the choice of system does not matter; it is rare for a
subsequent applicant to challenge the right of the first applicant to
the patent.l 5 The United States has always had a first-to-invent

13.
The U.S. patent system has two checks on the inventor who does not file a
patent application promptly: the statutory bars (see discussion infra note 120) and the
requirement that an inventor not have "suppressed or concealed" the invention (see
discussion infra note 87).
There are other theoretical solutions which are not under consideration for
14.
the international standard. One would be to deny a patent to anyone if there were
multiple claimants. There is one case in the United States presenting the rare case in
which two applicants claimed the same invention and both had the identical filing date
and the identical date of constructive reduction to practice; the Board of Patent
Appeals denied priority to both applicants. Lassman v. Brossi Gerecke & Kyburz, 159
U.S.P.Q. 182 (Pat. Off. Bd. of Pat. Interferences 1967). Another theoretical possibility
would be a system of multiple patents for the same invention, although this would
complicate licensing and reduce the value of patents. An intriguing option is the
Japanese model: If there are two or more claimants, they jointly decide who is to
receive the patent, but if they fail to agree, no one gets the patent. Tokkyohi'i [Patent
Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39(2), amended by Law No. 30 of 1990, available at
http://www.wipo.int/ clealdocs_new/en/jp/jp006en.html.
Published PTO statistics indicate that this is a rare event. See U.S. Pat. &
15.
Trademark Off., Patent Statistics Reports Available for Viewing, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/reports.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2007).
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system. 16 When two applications claim the same invention, the right
to the patent 17 is resolved by determining the first inventor in a
proceeding in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or Patent
Office), known as an "interference." 1 8 The first patent statute
conferred jurisdiction on the district courts to resolve competing
claims of inventorship. 19 The modern administrative interference
system was created in 1836, when the revised patent statute 20 shifted
the responsibility for resolving interfering claims to the
Commissioner of Patents. 2 1
Two consequences flow from the decision to adopt a first-toinvent system: (1) if two parties claim the same invention, the patent
is awarded to the first to reduce the invention to practice (not the first
to reach the patent office with news of the event); and (2) even if
there is only one claimant, a defendant in an infringement action may

16.
See Patent Act of 1790 §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 109, 109-110, 111; Patent Act of 1793
§§ 3, 6, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22.; Patent Act of 1836 § 9, 5 Stat. 117, 121 discussed in detail

infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Under current law:
In determining priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice
of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The U.S. Patent Statute contains a process, governed by 35
U.S.C. § 135(a), for determining first inventorship through an "interference" proceeding
in cases of dispute. See infra notes 69-70 (discussing the "interference" process). An
early article on harmonization argued that, in fact, the United States had a hybrid
system, pointing to statutory provisions giving advantages to domestic inventors, so
that patents could be denied to the first worldwide inventor. George E. Frost, The
1967 Patent Law Debate: First-to-Invent vs. First-to-File, 1967 DUKE L. J. 923 (1967).
Under the 1967 law, such a result could occur if the first invention was made outside
the United States. The patent statute has since been amended to expand the areas in
which inventive activity "counts" toward U.S. priority, putting inventors in any country
belonging to the World Trade Organization on an equal footing with domestic
inventors.
17.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(g). The first inventor must, of course, still comply
with the requirements of the patent statute. Of particular importance to the first-tofile debate, the first inventor must file an application within a year of the first public
use, offer for sale, or publication describing the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
18.
See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
19.
Patent Act of 1790 § 5, 1 Stat. at 109.
Patent Act of 1836 ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. at 117, 119.
20.
!d. § 8 at 120-21.
21.
(W)henever an application shall be made for a patent which, in the opinion of
the Commissioner, would interfere with any other patent for which an
application may be pending, or with any unexpired patent which shall have
been granted, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner to give notice thereof to
such applicants, or patentees, as the case may be; and if either shall be
dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner on the question of priority of
right or invention, on a hearing thereof, he may appeal from such decision.
!d.
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invalidate the patent by showing that the patentee was not the first
inventor. 22 It is possible for this to occur because the true first
inventor may simply have chosen not to seek patent protection. In
this case, no interference arises, and the patent will (unless the
examiner finds a statutory bar) issue to the subsequent inventor.
Other countries have first-to-file systems, awarding patents to
the first applicant for a patent, 23 even if there is a prior inventor who
also files an application for a patent. In the past, patents were
awarded to individuals who, while not inventors, were the first to
bring an invention within national borders and even to individuals
who simply were in favor with the government. 24 Some countries
began as first-to-invent countries but switched to first-to-file
countries. 25 It should be noted, however, that the patent systems
differ by country in significant respects, which make direct
comparison of first-to-invent and first-to-file difficult. For example,
the disclosure required in most first-to-file countries is less stringent
than what is required in the United States to obtain a valid priority
filing date. 26 In addition, one of the requirements of the U.S. system
is the disclosure of what the inventor believes to be the ''best mode" of

22.
The Patent Act of 1790 provided for repeal of a patent if it could be shown
that the patentee was not the first and true inventor. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat.
109, § 5. The affirmative defense of lack of invention was first explicitly codified by the
1793 Patent Act. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). The defense
continued to exist in every subsequent revision of the statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
In the 1967 Senate hearings, Acting Undersecretary of Commerce
23.
Hollomon reported that only the United States and the Philippines were first-to-invent
countries. Patent Law Revision: Hearings on S. 2, S.1042, S.l377 and S.l691 Before
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1967). The Philippines has since amended its
law to award patents to the first to file an application. The Law on Patents, Rep. Act
No. 8293, § 29 (Phil.); Phil. Rules & Reg. on Inventions, Rule 304 (amended 1998)
available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/s_sonota_e/fips_e/pdf/philippines_e/e_tizai_
kisoku.pdf. It would seem that for some reason the undersecretary excluded Canada,
which was a first-to-invent country in 1967, but Canada has since become a first-to-file
country. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (1988).
24.
See discussion supra note 10.
25.
Such countries include the Philippines and Canada. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text. Neither country had a constitutional provision restricting the
change.
26.
Frost, supra note 16; Samson Helfgott, "Differences Between U.S. and
Japanese Patent Applications, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 3 (1992).
[T]he major part of a Japanese application contains marketing and sales
promotion aspects of an invention. The actual detailed description of the
invention itself is typically done in a very general manner [and] ... the detail of
black boxes is generally left undescribed even though the specific contents may
not be readily available on the market.
Including ''black boxes" in an application would be unacceptable under U.S. practice
(see 35 U.S. C. § 112) and obviously an application can be prepared much more quickly
if it is not necessary to provide details.

2007]

HARMONIZATION THROUGH CONDEMNATION

453

carrying out the invention at the time the application is filed. 27
There is no duty to update this disclosure during prosecution of the
application. 28 Allowing an inventor additional time to perfect the
invention should result in better disclosures and therefore greater
contributions to the public domain. Finally, while the United States
only grants patents when the claimed invention is novel 29 and nonobvious,30 not all countries examine patent applications carefully to
make such determinations prior to issuing patents; 31 instead they
often rely on pre-grant publication for opposition or post-grant
litigation to resolve such issues.3 2
The modern drive to harmonize international patent law began
with the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property. 33 The principal agency of harmonization in the intellectual
property field is the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), an agency of the United Nations.34
There is no doubt that areas of the international intellectual
property system are in desperate need of harmonization. U.S. patent
holders are unable to obtain adequate protection in many countries.
The main areas of concern are outdated limits on the definition of
patentable subject matter and respect for the private property rights
created by a patent. In the United States, patents are broadly
available for "anything made by man;" 35 patentability in other

27.
The patent application must "set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
28.
29.
35 U.S.C. § 102.
35 u.s.c. § 103.
30.
31.
In 1964, a U.S. Government Printing Office publication reported that
France was only then starting to introduce pre-grant patentability searches and that
Latin America and many other countries still had not done so. Invention and the
Patent System, Joint Committee Print, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess., U.S. GPO 1964 at 13.
Id.
32.
33.
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
25 Stat. 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 30, revised by International Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Dec. 14, 1900, 32 Stat. 1936, 189 Consol. T.S. 134; International
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, June 2, 1911, 38 Stat. 1645, 213
Consol. T.S. 405; International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, Nov. 6,
1925, 100 Stat. 1789; International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property,
June 6, 1934, 53 Stat. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 10, International Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Oct. 31, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 1; International Union for the Protection
oflndustrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
34.
WIPO was established July 14, 1967 as a "specialized agency" of the United
Nations designed "(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the
world through cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with
any other international organization, (ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among
the Unions." Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
art. 3, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (amended Oct. 2 1979).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). Recent examples of
35.
patentable subject matter have included biotech inventions and business methods. See
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
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countries is limited or unavailable in many areas,
including
technologies in such important industries as software 3 6 and
biotechnology. 37 As a result, competitors in these arenas may
establish operations in many foreign countries and compete with U.S.
innovators without cost.
In the United States, a patent owner's rights are protected, even
against the government. 38 In many other countries, patent rights are,
as a practical matter, unenforceable or subject to routine threats of
nationalization. 39 A patentee in the United States may (within the

EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2105 (8th ed., 2nd rev. 2004); State Street Bank &
Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed Cir. 1998), cert. den. 525
U.S. 1093 (1999); Notification of Required and Optional Search Criteria for Computer
Implemented Business Method Patent Applications in Class 705, 66 Fed. Reg. 30, 167
(June 5, 2001).
36.
Software is not patentable under the European Patent Convention. Article
52(2) of the European Patent Convention provides: ''The following . . . shall not be
regarded as inventions ... c) schemes, rules, and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers ...." European Patent
Convention art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199; see also European Patent
Convention art. 53, quoted infra note 37; Hungarian Law on the Protection of
Inventions by Patents, art. 1, 2(a), available at http://www.hpo.hu/English/
jogforras/shlaw.html?9533:1pC (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that "discoveries,
scientific theories, and mathematical methods" are not patentable); United Kingdom
Patent Office, Requirements for Patent Protections, http://www.patent.gov.uk/patent/papplying/p-should/p-should-requirements.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that
discoveries are not patentable); Phil. Rules and Regs. on Inventions 202(b) (methods of
doing business are not patentable).
37.
European Patent Convention Article 53 provides: "European patents shall
not be granted in respect of ... (b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to
microbiological processes or the products thereof." European Patent Convention art.
52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. The famed transgenic "Harvard oncomouse,"
patented in the United States in 1988 (U.S. Pat. 4, 736,866), was found unpatentable in
Canada. Harvard College v. Canada (Comm'r of Patents), [2002) S.C. C. 76 (Can.). See
generally Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New
Technologies, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 523, 528 (2002); Donna M. Gitter, International
Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1648-49 (2001);
Michael Guntersdorfer, Software Patent Law: United States and Europe Compared,
2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6; Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents And Traditional Knowledge Of
The Uses Of Plants: Is A Communal Patent Regime Part Of The Solution To The
Scourge Of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 163, 181 n. 74 (2001).
38.
While injunctions are not available against the federal government, a
patent owner is entitled to compensation for government use of patented technology.
See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. The federal government also has the
power to take patents, as it does any other property, provided the taking is for a public
use and it pays adequate compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment. Id. To
date, the most common reason for exercising this power is to preserve the secrecy of the
contents of the patent for national security reasons. The procedure for preventing
issuance of such a patent and determining compensation is set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§§ 181-83 (2006) and in 37 C.F.R. 5.3-5.5 (2006).
39.
For example, Brazil routinely threatens to nationalize pharmaceutical
patents: Hoffman-LaRoce's viracept in 2001, Merck's nelfinavir in 2003, Abbot's
Kaletra in 2005. International Pharmaceutical Industry Weighs Issues of Patent
Rights, Public Access, THE FOOD & DRUG LETTER, Nov. 21, 2003, § 688; Doug Bandow,
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limits set by antitrust laws) 40 choose whether and to whom to license
patented technology; 41 the marketplace sets the price. In many
foreign countries, a patent holder is required to "work" the patent to
maintain it, is required to grant licenses to competitors, or is subject
to nationalization of the patent without adequate compensation. 42
The area of harmonization on the top of the WIPO list, however,
is not agreement on patentable subject matter or the enforceability of
patent rights or compensation for patent owners when a government
feels that a compelling national interest requires termination of the
patent. The area of harmonization on the top of the list is agreement
on whether the party entitled to a patent should be the inventor or
the first party to file an application with a signatory patent office. 43
Some U.S. interests favor using negotiation of this issue as a
bargaining chip for harmonizing the important areas of scope of
patent protection and protection from nationalization without just
compensation by U.S. standards. 44
Proposals for change go back at least to 1966, when the
President's Commission on the Patent System, appointed by
President Lyndon Johnson, recommended that the United States
switch from its historical first-to-invent system to a first-to-file
system. 45 Implementing legislation was submitted in 1967 46 but
failed.

Ploys from Brazil: South American Country Flouts U.S. Patent Laws, COPLEY NEWS
SERV., June 28, 2005.
See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal with Competitors by
40.
Owners of Patents and Copyrights: Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox
Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 1234-43 (2006). While substantially weakened by
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 54 7 U.S. 28 (2006), patent misuse may be the basis
for antitrust violations under Int'l Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
41.
Cont'l Paper Bag v. E. Paper Bag, 210 U.S. 405, 405 (1908) (holding that it
was not a defense to infringement that the patent was "a mere paper proposition which
the complainant has never put into effect or use"). The current patent statute
explicitly provides that the patentee's failure to grant a license is not a defense to
infringement unless the patentee has market power in the relevant market. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d).

42.
See articles cited supra note 39.
Statistics indicate that in the United States, the issue arises in about
43.
0.05% of the applications filed. Patent Statistics Report, supra note 9. About 51% of
those cases would be decided differently under first-to-file. Ian A. Calvert & Michael
Sofocleous, Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1983 to 1985, 68 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 385, 390 (1986) (noting that priority was awarded to the junior
party in whole or in part 48.8% of the time during fiscal years 1983-1985 when
testimony was taken).
44.
Daniel Pruzin, Lead Report: PTO Chief Says U.S. Willing to Be Flexible On
U.S. Rules to Secure Global Patent Treaty, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW
DAILY, Mar. 27, 2002.
45.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "TO PROMOTE THE
PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 5 (1966). The
report lists as its first recommendation that "when two or more persons separately
apply for a patent on the same invention, the patent would issue to the one who is first
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In 1987, the Clinton Administration indicated that it might be
willing to change from first-to-invent to first-to-file in return for
certain concessions from other countries, 47 but it ultimately rejected
the conversion. 48 In 1990, the WIPO Committee of Experts on the
Harmonization of Certain Provisions in Laws for the Protection of
Inventions proposed a treaty requiring that signatories' laws provide
that the patent for an "invention shall belong to the applicant with
the earliest priority date." 49 When the treaty was debated, the
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Journal reported:
At the June 1990 meeting of the Committee of Experts, the delegation
of the United States stated that for the United States to adopt the first·
to-file system involved a fundamental change. There was no consensus
in the United States that this change should be made. None of the
interested associations had taken a position in favor of this change, and
there were powerful, vocal elements which actively opposed it. 5°

On January 24, 1994, the Commerce Department issued a press
release stating that the United States would not seek to resume
negotiations of a treaty harmonizing the world's patent laws at that
time. 51 In 2002, then-Patent Office Director Rogan indicated that a
shift to first-to-invent was still open for discussion. 52 The drive to
move the United States from first-to-invent to first-to-file is again

to file." Id. The commission concluded that the change would encourage prompt
disclosure, eliminate interference proceedings, and harmonize U.S. practice with
almost all other industrial nations. I d. at 6.
Patent Reform Act of 1967, S.1042, 90th Cong. (1967); Patent Reform Act of
46.
1967, H.R. 5924, 90th Cong. (1967).
47.
Statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Sec'y & Comm'r of Patents &
Trademarks (Mar. 16, 1987), available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/con/files/cons
123.htm.
48.
William A. Beltz et. al., U.S. Says ''Not Now" on First-to-File and Agrees
with Japan on Patent Term, 47 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 285, 285 (1994).
WIPO Draft Treaty for Patent Harmonization, art. 9, § 2, Oct. 2, 2000,
49.
available at www.wipo.org/edocs/scp/en/scp_4/scp_4_3.pdf. The current draft of the
treaty provides that the patent should be issued "where two or more applications are
filed in respect of that invention, to the applicant whose application has the earliest
filing date or, where priority is claimed, the earliest priority date ...." The priority
date is the date when a patent application is first filed in a country signatory to the
treaty. Id. at art. 2(ii).
50.
Edward G. Fiorito, WIPO Experts Make Progress on Patent Harmonization
Draft, 41 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 231, 232-33 (1991).
51.
Beltz et. al., supra note 48, at 285.
52.
Pruzin, supra note 44.
Speaking to reporters in Geneva, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and PTO director James Rogan declared that "everything ought to be
on the table for discussion," including the controversy over the U.S. "first to
invent" system versus the "first to file" system used elsewhere in the world
which has stymied past efforts to draft a global patent treaty.

I d.
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underway. 5 3
In analyzing the wisdom of this move, many
commentators start with the proposition that "[t]he United States'
first-to-invent system ... prevents true harmonization with the rest
of the world." 54
While it is correct that the U.S. system is
inconsistent with the rest of the world's, it would be equally correct to
say that the rest of the world's first-to-file system prevents
harmonization. The debate is not advanced by arguments over which
of two inconsistent systems is "the inconsistent one," nor is there any
principle of constitutional law which permits Congress to exceed its
authority because "all the other countries are doing it."
B. Early History and Overview of Current U.S. Patent Priority Law

Patents are a special exception to the general prohibition of
monopolies inherited from England. Early English patents were
often political grants, unrelated to invention; "the most important
ones were nothing but monopolies on well-known trades, granted to
secure favors to some courtiers, to procure money for the Crown, or to
assert a national economic policy against some local privileges." 55
The English Statute of Monopolies restricted the grant of monopolies
but allowed them to be granted to the first and true inventor of new
manufactures for a term of fourteen years. 56
In the United States, the Constitution gave Congress the power
to grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors for limited times, 57
and the first Congress responded, in its second session, with the first
U.S. patent statute. 5 8 It gave the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
War, and the Attorney General (the "Commissioners for the

53.
On August 3, 2006, Senators Hatch and Leahy introduced the Patent
Reform Act of 2006 which includes a shift to first-to-file. S.8831, 109th Cong. (2006);
see also H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2006).
54.
Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There
Limits on the United States' Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6
(2004).
55.
Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 166,
168 (1948).
56.
The Statute of Monopolies, 1624, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, §VI, prohibited the grant
of monopolies with the following exception:
any declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any letters-patent and
grants of privilege, for the term of fourteen years or under hereafter to be
made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures,
within the realm, to be the true and first inventor and inventors of such
manufactures, which others, at the time of making such letters-patents and
grant, shall not use, so as also they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous
to the state .... (emphasis added).

I d.
57.
58.

U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (repealed 1793).
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Promotion of Useful Arts") 59 the power to grant a patent for fourteen
years to anyone who "hath ... invented or discovered any useful art,
manufacture . . . or device, or any improvement therein not before
known or used," and also provided for repeal of patent grants if it
could be shown that "the patentee was not the first and true
inventor."60
The second patent statute, enacted in 1793, gave the Secretary of
State the power to grant patents to any U.S. citizen who "invented
any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement ... not known or used
before the application .... "6 1
Although the 1790 statute provided for repeal of issued patents
and defenses to infringement if the patentee was not the first
inventor, the 1793 statute made the first statutory provision for
administrative resolution of multiple claims to the same invention: A
three person board was appointed (one member by the Secretary of
State and one member by each of the claimants) to decide entitlement
to the patent. 62
The basis for the board's decision was a
determination of the true and first invention. 63 While the argument
might be made that the lack of specific authority in the original
statute to resolve multiple claims is inconsistent with a belief that the
patent constitutionally belonged to the first inventor, it is more likely
that, having established the principle, there was no perceived need to
spend legislative time on an elaborate process, as only three patents
were issued in 1790. 64 The patent statute enacted in 1836 created
the formal examination bureaucracy and an administrative procedure
for determining the right to a patent among competing claimants. 65
The current patent law remains a first-to-invent system: Only
the first inventor may receive the patent for any given invention. 66 If

59.
Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1966).
60.
Patent Act of 1790; see supra note 22; infra notes 170-71.
61.
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 318-23 (repealed 1832); see infra
notes 172-75.
62.
Patent Act of 1793 § 9.
63.
WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS AND USEFUL INVENTION 211
n.2 (1890).
64.
Thirty-three patents were issued in 1791, eleven in 1792, twenty in 1793,
and twenty-two in 1794. The first year in which more than 100 patents were issued
was 1808. In 2005 (the last year for which data is available), 143,806 patents were
issued. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO
THE PRESENT, available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/oeip/taffh_counts.pdf (last visited
Feb. 28, 2007) [hereinafter PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR).
65.
See infra note 179.
66.
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (2006). Others may apply for a patent under special
circumstances, such as when the inventor is unavailable or refuses to honor a
contractual commitment to sign the application. 35 U.S.C. § 118. Patents are personal
property and therefore may be assigned. 35 U.S.C. § 261. Inventions made by
corporate employees are frequently issued to the employer pursuant to an assignment
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two or more applicants claim the same invention and are not
precluded by a statutory bar, 67 the U.S. Patent Office will determine
which of the claimants is the first and true inventor through an
interference. 68 Although the process may be expensive and time
consuming, 69 the rules are simple: To be eligible for the patent, a
claimant must have conceived of the invention and reduced it to
practice, 70 either by making a working embodiment of the invention
or by filing a patent application. 71 The successful claimant is the one
who was the first person to conceive 72 of the invention unless that
person is not diligent in reducing the invention to practice. 73 If the
first conceiver was not diligent in reducing the invention to practice,
that applicant forfeits the right to the patent, and the process

under 35 U.S.C. § 152. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee
Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (1999).
See discussion infra note 122.
67.
The interference process is provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), and the
68.
administrative rules are set out in Chapter 2300 of the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP).
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MPEP (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007)
[hereinafter MPEP].
69.
An extreme example, U.S. Pat. 2,705,484 (Mechanism for Controlling the
Starting and Operation of Internal Combustion Engines), was filed in 1932 and not
issued until 1955. An interference was declared in 1935 and decided in 1939, followed
by additional interferences declared in 1939 and 1944 and a suit to compel the
Commissioner of Patents to issue the patent. Jorgensen v. Kingsland, 83 F. Supp. 319
(D.D.C. 1949).
Such extreme delays are not, however, unique to first-to-invent
countries. It took Texas Instruments nearly thirty years to obtain the Japanese patent
on the integrated circuit. Texas Instruments applied for the patent on February 6,
1960, and received conditional approval in 1986, but Japanese companies filed
objections which delayed issue until 1989. John Burgess, Japan Gives U.S. Firm
Circuit Patent, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 22, 1989, at E2.
After almost 30 years of consideration, Japan has granted Texas Instruments a
patent on the integrated circuit, the basic invention of miniaturized circuitry
that has made the computer age possible. Some American and Japanese
analysts have contended that Japan delayed the patent for so long so it could
nurture its own electronics industry ....
The same article reports that a 1987 report of the U.S. Trade Representative alleged
that patent applications generally took twice as long as in the United States. Id.
70.
Bedford v. Hunt, 3 Fed. Cas. 37 (C.C. Mass. 1817).
71.
If a patent application is enabling, it is a constructive reduction to practice,
so the date of invention is the date of filing at the latest. Alexander Milburn. v. DavisBournonville, 270 U.S. 390, 392 (1925); Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc. v. Feder
Indus., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 1487, 1505 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 26 F.3d
1112 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
72.
Conception is the "formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied
in practice." ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 532.
73.
35 u.s.c. § 102(g) (2006).
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continues until only one applicant remains. 74 The earliest applicant
(referred to as the "senior party" to the interference) is presumed to
be the first inventor, and subsequent applicants (referred to as
"junior parties") must establish their earlier date of invention. 75
C. Overview of Non-U.S. Patent Priority Law
Although the United States rejected the approach, early
European statutes rewarded the first person to bring a new
technology into the country. 76 The first example of modern patent
law is attributed to a statute of the Republic of Venice, enacted March
19, 1474:
[E]very person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it
to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to
every other person in our territories and towns to make any further
device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and
licence of the author, for a term of 10 years. 77

This approach allows so-called "patents of importation," which do not
require the applicant to be an inventor at all. Patents of importation
are granted to anyone who brings new technology into the
jurisdiction. Such an approach made more sense in a time when
methods of communication were not advanced. 78 It has been rejected
by modern industrial patent systems. 79

74.
The required diligence need not begin until immediately prior to the
conception by the second claimant. Scott v. Satoshi Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1244-46
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
75.
The first applicant enjoys a presumption that the claimed invention was
completed as of the filing date and therefore has no need to prove an earlier date unless
challenged. If the first applicant needs to prove a date of invention earlier than the
filing date, the proof must be by clear and convincing, independent, third party,
corroborating evidence. The inventor's testimony alone cannot meet the burden of
proof. Maxwell v. K Mart Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1323, 1329 (D. Minn. 1995). If the junior
application is filed more than three months after the senior application, the junior
party faces additional evidentiary requirements. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b); MPEP,
supra note 68, § 2308.01. If the effective filing date of the applicant is more than three
months after the effective filing date of the patent, 37 C.F.R. 1.608(b) requires that the
applicant must file (1) evidence, such as patents, publications and other documents,
and one or more affidavits or declarations which demonstrate that applicant is prima
facie entitled to a judgment relative to the patentee, and (2) an explanation stating
with particularity the basis upon which the applicant is prima facie entitled to
judgment. 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b).
See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76.
77.
JOINT ECON. COMM., 88TH CONG., INVENTION AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 11
(Comm. Print 1964).
Patents of importation were allowed in seventeenth century England. See
78.
Edgebury v. Stephens, 17 Webst. Pat. Cases 35 (1691).
[I]f the invention be new in England, a patent may be granted though the thing
was practiced beyond sea before; for the statute speaks of new manufactures
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The European Patent Convention 80 is representative of modern
first-to-file systems. Under Article 54:
1. An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of
the state of the art.
2. The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made
available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use,
or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent
application. 81

And under Article 60(2), "if two or more persons have made an
invention independently of each other, the right to the European
patent shall belong to the person whose European patent application
has the earliest date of filing .... "82
Similarly, Japan's Patent Act provides, in Article 39:
1. Where two or more patent applications relating to the same
invention are filed on different dates, only the first applicant may
obtain a patent for the invention.
2. Where two or more patent applications are filed on the same date,
only one such applicant, agreed upon after mutual consultation among
all the applicants, may obtain a patent for the invention. If no
agreement is reached . . . none of the applicants shall obtain a
patent .... 83

As noted above, the United States is the only country in which the
date of invention rather than the date of filing drives the
determination of priority among claimants. If harmonization is
desirable, and if the direction of harmonization should be determined
by a head count of countries in each camp, then the norm is clearly
first-to-file.

within this realm; so that if it is new here, it is within the statute; for the act
intended to encourage new devices useful to the kingdom, and whether learned
by travel or by study it is the same thing.

ld.
79.
Patents of importation were also rejected by the first Congress, although
they still existed in England at the time:
There is nothing whatever to indicate or suggest that in drafting the Clause the
Framers intended it to encompass a narrower view of patentable novelty than
that which existed in Great Britain. Yet the first Congress assumed this to be
the case and refused to authorize patents of importation on the grounds that
such were constitutionally precluded.
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: the
Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 49 (2002).
80.
European Pat. Off., Convention on the Grant of European Patents
(European Patent Convention), Oct. 5 1973, available at http://www.european-patentoffice.org/legal/epc/e/mal.html [hereinafter European Patent Convention].
81.
Id. at art. 54, §§ (1)-(2).
European Patent Convention, supra note 80, at art. 60, § (2).
82.
Tokkyohii [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39.
83.
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D. The Economic and Political Arguments Regarding First-to-File
While the number of applicants affected may be small, each time
a switch to first-to-file has been proposed, the debate has been
vigorous. 84 Proponents focus on the first-to-file system's incentive for
early filing, efficiency, and potential concessions that might be gained
in return for the change, 85 and opponents focus on the fairness and
successful track record of the current system. 86 The political wisdom
of a switch to first-to-file is beyond the scope of this Article, but it will
be helpful to place the discussion in context by summarizing the
policy arguments that have been advanced by others in support of
each system.

84.
Each proposal has generated considerable scholarly debate over the wisdom
and constitutionality of the proposed change. See, e.g., Donald W. Banner, Patent Law
Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 9 (1992) (former Patent Commissioner
concluding that "harmonization would be an act of incalculable harm to the future of
our nation"); Ned L. Conley, First-To-Invent: A Superior System For the United States,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779 (1991) (arguing that the United States should stay with its
current first-to-invent system); Donald R. Dunner, First to File: Should Our
Interference System be Abolished?, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 561, 566 (1986)
(concluding that the United States should join the rest of world in adopting first-to-file
system); Charles R.B. Macedo, First-To-File: Is American Adoption of the International
Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. AsS'N Q.J. 193, 234
(1990) (concluding that United States should consider adopting the first-to-file system
if favorable harmonization treaty is reached); Bernarr R. Pravel, Why the United States
Should Adopt the First-To-File System For Patents, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797 (1991)
(arguing that United States should adopt the first-to-file system); Gregory J. Wrenn,
What Should Be our Priority-Protection for the First to File or the First to Invent?, 72
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 872, 891 (1990) (concluding that the United States
stands to gain by adopting first-to-file, and "[a]rguments that the Constitution forbids
such a change are tenable, but ultimately are not persuasive and should not prevent
action by Congress").
85.
See ABA Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, Proposed
Resolution 102--{)7 (2005); Joint Hearing on S.2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the
Subcomm. on Pat., Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary & the
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. & Judicial Admin. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd
Cong. (1992) (statement of American Intellectual Property Law Association that
adoption of the first-to-file system would eliminate the need for interference
proceedings); Pruzin, supra note 44.
The Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit stated that "[m]any giant
86.
corporations have no need of a patent system .... [and] would be glad to compete on
size, nationwide service, high volume, strong finance, and prompt delivery. They can
kill off smaller competitors on any of those bases, unless the small competitor has a
patent ...." Howard T. Markey, Some Patent Problems: Philosophical, Philological
and Procedural, 80 F.R.D. 203, 210 (1978--79). Former Commissioner of Patents
Banner likewise questions the motives and wisdom ofthe first-to-file system: "A strong
attempt is being made to abandon the equitable U.S. patent system that has served us
so well and replace it with a foreign type system which would aid the multinational
corporations but mortally injure the individual inventor and small companies."
Banner, supra note 84, at 12. ''The proposed sacrifice of the individual inventor on the
alter of international patent harmonization would be an act of incalculable harm to the
future of our nation." I d. at 16.
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Arguments for Change

Proponents of the proposed first-to-file system suggest a number
of advantages. In 1990, the American Bar Association Section of
Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law favored the adoption of a
first-to-file system, if only by a slight majority, noting that it would
encourage prompt filing, reduce costs, speed the grant of patents by
eliminating interferences, and promote harmonization. 87
The
committee dismissed constitutional arguments, noting that existing
law already denied patents to first inventors who had suppressed,
abandoned, or concealed their invention. 88
The strongest theoretical89 argument in favor of shifting to firstto-file is that it is perceived as promoting early disclosure. 90 Because
an inventor has no way of knowing whether others are working on
the same invention, the only safe course of action under first-to-file is
to file a patent application as quickly as possible. The sooner an
application is filed, the sooner it will become public and further the
policy of encouraging dissemination of knowledge. 91
The strongest political argument in favor of shifting is
harmonization with most other countries, 92 leading to improved

87.
ABA Section of Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law, supra note 85.
The constitutional arguments are discussed at infra Part III.A-C. There is
88.
a distinction to be made between withdrawing one's entitlement to a patent for
deliberately violating a policy and denying entitlement to one who complied with the
policy. Where an inventor has suppressed the invention, there is not only forfeiture of
the right to the patent but also no addition to the prior art; thus, a subsequent inventor
who does make the required contribution to the public domain should not be barred by
the suppressed invention. On the other hand, where there is no suppression and, in
fact, the first inventor is in the process of placing the invention in the public domain,
there is no policy justification for forfeiture to a second inventor.
89.
Theoretical arguments involve furthering a constitutional, as opposed to
political, purpose. Article I, Section Eight can be read as favoring early disclosure as a
means of furthering the progress of the useful arts by disseminating information. The
current first-to-invent system provides incentives for early filing: The first inventor can
lose the right to a patent if there has been a publication describing the invention
anywhere in the world, in any language, more than a year before the application is
filed. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2006). Since there is no way of knowing when such a
publication might occur, the safest course, even under a first to invent system, is to file
as promptly as possible.
90.
See Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be Our Priority: Protection for the
First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 872, 885 (1990)
(remarking that the first to file system is consistent with, though not necessary to
implement, an early disclosure policy).
Proponents of the first-to-invent system raise the concern that first-to-file
91.
will dramatically increase the number of applications, overwhelm the Patent Office,
and lead to delays in issuing patents. This would not, however, delay disseminating
the information since applications are generally published approximately eighteen
months after filing, even if the application is still pending. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b).
92.
Vito J. DeBari, International Harmonization of Patent Law: a Proposed
Solution to the United States' First-to-file Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 702
(1993) ("Proponents of first-to-file argue that it should be adopted because it is a much
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predictability93 and, it is hoped, producing efficiency, lower costs of
obtaining international protection, 94 and concessions on other issues
of concern to U.S. interests. 95 Sean T. Carnathan notes the
aspiration that, ''by bringing the U.S. system into harmonization with
the rest of the world, the United States would also garner concessions
from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) when
negotiating other aspects of international intellectual property
law .... The ultimate goal, the first-to-filers suggest, is a single
world-wide patent application." 96 The principal efficiency in the short
run would be reduction of the time and expense spent in
interferences 97 and, some argue, reduced recordkeeping costs, even

more efficient system and will enable the United States to participate in and benefit
from the proposed patent law harmonization treaty."); see also Kim Taylor, Patent
Harmonization Treaty Negotiations on Hold: The "First To File" Debate Continues, 20
J. CONTEMP. L. 521, 534 (1994) (remarking that "the goal of harmonizing patent laws
worldwide would be more closely met if the United States aligned itself with the firstto-file procedure").
93.
Macedo, supra note 84, at 216; Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is NowThe Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 298 (1995)
(arguing that evaluation of inventorship under the current system is uncertain because
the "precise dates of conception and reduction to practice may be difficult to ascertain,
even with detailed records"; the "quality of diligence each party exercised in reducing
their conceived invention to practice is a subjective determination that lies with the
trier of fact"; and the "amount of abandonment, suppression, or concealment sufficient
to penalize an inventor is also subjective and is not defined in the statute"); Taylor,
supra note 92, at 533. There is one important respect in which shifting to first-to-file
might actually weaken patent protection. Currently, an alleged infringer can defend
by showing that the claimed invention was known by others prior to the patentee's date
of invention. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In a first-to-file system, the
analogous defense would be a showing that the claimed invention was known by others
prior to the patentee's date of filing. Since by definition filing cannot precede
invention, the result is weaker patent protection, greater uncertainty, and more
litigation.
94.
DeBari, supra note 92, at 710 ("Additional advantages associated with the
adoption of a harmonization treaty include the reduction of costs in obtaining patent
protection internationally, reduction of costs associated with defending a patent, better
enforcement of patent protection worldwide, and the simplification of international
patent law"); see also Wrenn, supra note 90, at 879 (asserting that "harmony in the
international patent practice would avoid cost involved with the dual patent anomaly
that can occur is today's world").
95.
Pruzin, supra note 44.
Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-Definition of
96.
''First-to-Invent," 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 794 (1998).
97.
Taylor believes the interference system can be eliminated by adopting firstto-file. Taylor, supra note 92, at 532-33. This seems unlikely. Macedo observes that
these cost savings would be limited, because:
much of the procedural simplicity and cost savings to the applicants offered by
a first-to-file system would be eliminated due to the two limitations currently
being considered by WIPO, e.g., the derivation right, and the prior user
right . . . . [A]n interference system would be necessary to determine if the
applicant for a prior user right had commercially used the invention before the
filing date of the patent which had been awarded. Therefore, in the end the
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with respect to purely domestic applications. 98 In the 1992 attempt
to shift to first-to-file, the president of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association (AIPLA) testified that adoption of a first-tofile system would eliminate the need for interference proceedings. 99
This underestimates the ingenuity of skilled lawyers representing
well-funded clients in high stakes contests. 1oo Except in the highly
theoretical case of two applicants submitting identically worded
specifications, including identically worded claims, there will always
be the possibility of testing, for example, whether the first filer has
claimed the same invention and has enabled the invention. 101 Even
in that highly theoretical case, there will also be the possibility of
testing whether the first filer has complied with the requirements to
receive a filing date and has not violated some public policy, such as
suppression of the invention or inequitable conduct. 102
The argument has also been made that harmonization to first-tofile would reduce the likelihood that U.S. inventors would

treaty is unlikely to provide any significant cost savings to applicants resulting
from adoption of a first-to-file system.
Charles R.B. Macedo, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard
in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 543, 571 (1988).
Furthermore, as Carnathan points out, "even if the nation switched to a first-to-file
system, the dates of conception and reduction to practice would remain relevant,
absent further amendment to the system, in disputes over whether an invention was
disclosed prior to the patent applicant's date of invention." Carnathan, supra note 96,
at n.191; see also Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885. More conservative commentators
assert that at least the change to first-to-file will reduce the cost and complexity of
interferences. See, e.g., DeBari, supra note 92, at 709.
98.
Both Pritchard and Carnathan note that U.S. inventors are required to
keep accurate records of all acts of invention in the event that a patent is involved in
an interference proceeding and the inventor is required to prove conception, reduction
to practice, and diligence. Pritchard, supra note 93, at 313; Carnathan, supra note 96,
at 768. Most companies probably keep records for other reasons in addition to
anticipation of interference proceedings. For example, such records might be kept in
general to demonstrate independent discovery as a defense to possible trade secret
misappropriation. If independent invention remains a defense to patent infringement,
or if prior user rights are adopted, prudent companies will still keep detailed, timeverified records of their activities. Companies in regulated industries, such as
pharmaceuticals, have independent record-keeping requirements. It is thus unlikely
that companies will abandon keeping careful records of their experiments simply
because the patent system is changed to first-to-file.
99.
Joint Hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978, supra note 85, at 93 ("If the
United States adopts first-to-file, the question of right to a patent between interfering
parties would be satisfied by a quick examination of filing dates, thus eliminating the
need for interference proceedings.").
100.
See Macedo, supra note 97, at 572 ("The most likely result of adoption of
the WIPO system would be a replacement of the current hypertechnicality with a new
hypertechnicality .").
See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai Pharm., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (deciding
101.
validity of competing patents regarding DNA sequences for encoding Erythropoietin
(EPO)).
102.
35 u.s.c. § 102(g) (2006).
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inadvertently forfeit foreign patent rights by misunderstanding grace
periods. 103 Under current law, a U.S. applicant has a year from
public disclosure within which to file an application, 104 while that
same delay would defeat patentability in most of the rest of the
world. 105 To the extent that inadvertent loss of foreign rights by
mistakenly believing that the rest of the world has the same grace
period as the United States is a problem, the solution would seem to
be harmonization of the grace period rather than harmonization of
priority, a solution which would not present the serious constitutional
doubts raised by the ftrst-to-ftle proposal.
Proponents also argue that few will be affected by the change.106
''More than 99.9% of the patent applications that are currently filed
in the United States raise no dispute as to the identity of the inventor
[and] these statistics clearly indicate that there would be no
signiftcant difference in result between a ftrst-to-ftle system and a
ftrst-to-invent system." 107 At least with respect to international
corporations, the argument has been made that they already need to
conform to the rest of the world's ftrst-to-file system and so would not
change their procedures in response to a U.S. shift to ftrst-to-file.l 08
Optimistic proponents hope that switching to a ftrst-to-file
system will only be the ftrst step toward a completely harmonized
international patent system. 109 While procedural harmonization is at
least conceivable, the prospect of a single ftling resulting in a

103.
Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885.
104.
35 u.s.c. § 102(d).
105.
See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 80, art. 52 available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legallepc/e/ar52.html ("(1) European patents
shall be granted for any inventions which are susceptible of industrial application,
which are new and which involve an inventive step."), Id. art. 54, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legallepc/e/ar54.html ("(1) An invention shall be
considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art. (2) The state of the
art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a
written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the
European patent application.").
106.
See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 97, at 568-69 (stating that "few of the people
who file for patents actually declare interferences").
107.
DeBari, supra note 92, at 707. These statistics only reflect declared
interferences. Inventors are not required to supply their date of invention unless an
interference is declared and contested.
108.
Pritchard, supra note 93, at 313.
109.
Macedo, supra note 97, at 581-82 (summarizing the advantages of
harmonization, including reduced transaction costs of obtaining a patent, on the
assumption that "[i]f the substantive and procedural rules were the same everywhere,
only one set of arguments would need to be developed"; reduced costs of enforcing
patents, on the assumption that "[i]f patent laws were harmonized, a judgment of
validity in one country might be given either res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in
other countries . . . [or] at least a strong presumption of validity"; and simpler
international protection of patents resulting from fewer substantive and procedural
rules); see also Carnathan, supra note 96, at 794 (remarking that the ultimate goal of
first-to-filers is a single world-wide patent application).
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universally enforceable patent is beyond reason. Countries differ on
fundamentals other than procedure, such as patentable subject
matter and standards of patentability.
One commentator argues that the existence of the U.S. first-toinvent system alongside first-to-file systems leads to the possibility
that a licensee might need to license two patents to practice the same
invention: the U.S. patent and the foreign patents. 110 This, however,
is a result not of the first-to-invent system, but of the existence of two
systems. In fact, the problem would be resolved more completely if
the world harmonized on a first-to-invent system (since there could
only be one first inventor); in a first-to-file system, it would still be
possible to have multiple patents on the same invention. 111
Two negatives of shifting to a first-to-file system should be noted.
It would not be surprising to see a "race to the bottom," with
applications being filed in those countries which make it easiest to get
a filing date 112 and at least some countries competing for the business
by accommodating minimal filings. Presumably, the United States
would still require a filing to be enabling, 113 so it would not be
surprising to see a dramatic increase in challenges along those lines,
placing an increased burden on the Patent Office or the courts.
Moreover, if the United States retained the requirement that a filing
must be enabling, it would place U.S. inventors at a great
disadvantage with respect to their foreign competitors. Under U.S.
law, a U.S. inventor must not file a patent application abroad without
either obtaining a license to do so (a time consuming process) or first
filing the application in the United States and waiting six months. 114
Thus, U.S. citizens will be unable to take advantage of more relaxed
filing requirements abroad, and the contest between two otherwise
equal claimants will always go to the foreign applicant. The other

110.
Wrenn, supra note 90, at 872-73, 877.
111.
Consider the situation in which Inventor A files only in Country A,
Inventor B files only in Country B, and so forth. In each country where the mere filing
of an application abroad does not destroy novelty, a separate patent will be issued for
the same invention and will be enforceable within the associated borders. Thus, one
seeking to market the invention worldwide will require multiple licenses. If the patent
were only available to the first inventor, there would at most be only one patentee
worldwide.
Current U.S. law requires U.S. inventors to file in the United States first,
112.
or to obtain a foreign filing license. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (2006). It is likely that there will
be enormous pressure to relax this requirement to avoid placing U.S. inventors at a
disadvantage with respect to inventors from other countries. One of the purposes of
the requirement, though, is to give the government the opportunity to review
technology for national security concerns and prevent filing abroad if doing so would
jeopardize national security. Relaxing the requirement will therefore pose complicated
tradeoffs between competitiveness and national security.
113.
In the United States, a patent application must be sufficiently detailed to
enable one skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
114.
35 u.s.c. § 184.

468

VANDERBILT jOURNAL OF TR.ANSNA TIONAL LAW

(VOL 40:445

less quantifiable negative is the message such a move would send,
incentivizing filing rather than invention.
2.

Arguments for the Status Quo

The strongest theoretical argument in favor of the current firstto-invent system is that fairness (and the U.S. Constitution) demand
that the patent be awarded to the inventor, meaning the first to
invent not the first to reach the patent office. 115 As discussed in
detail at Part II infra, there are strong arguments that Article I,
Section Eight requires that any patents be issued to the first inventor
who complies with statutory application requirements and therefore
prevents switching to a first-to-file system. Proponents also argue
that a patent system should reward invention, not paperwork. 11 6
The strongest practical argument in favor of the status quo is
that it conserves Patent Office resources compared to a first-to-file
system, all other things being equal.
Even if the quality of
applications does not decline, a first-to-file system is expected to
result in a significant increase in the number of applications which
the PTO must examine. 117 Unless other things change (for example,
a return to the registration system of 1793), the available evidence
indicates that quality will in fact decline and therefore make
examination more difficult. 118 It is argued that under the current

115.
Banner, supra note 84, at 12 ("[A]ward to the first inventor is both logical
and fair."); DeBari, supra note 92, at 702 ("Commentators and practitioners opposed to
adopting a first-to-file system maintain that first-to-invent is an inherently fairer
system because it rewards the original inventor and has served the United States well
for over 150 years."); Macedo, supra note 97, at 576 (''The Anglo-American patent
tradition, from the Cases on Monopolies to the present-day patent law, strongly
suggests that it is the first inventor who is the more deserving."). Although Macedo
notes that since the purpose of granting patents is to encourage the "Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts" by granting limited monopolies in exchange for disclosure,
"it may be just as reasonable to grant a patent to the first person to disclose an
invention, as it would be to grant a patent to the first inventor .... " I d. at 577.
116.
Taylor, supra note 92, at 536 (stating the first-to-file system elevates
"paperwork over true invention").
117.
See Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885; Taylor, supra note 92, at 536. The theory
is that inventors will respond by filing applications when the invention is first
conceived in order to secure the earliest possible priority date, and they will continue to
file additional applications as the invention is developed, rather than wait for a
complete formulation of the preferred embodiment of the invention before filing.
118.
Macedo predicts that under a first-to-file system, the number of
applications filed at the Patent Office would increase in quantity and decrease in
quality, noting that over five times as many applications are filed in Japan (a first-tofile country) than in the United States and that many of the 600,000 Japanese
applications are scraps of papers written by the inventors and submitted for a priority
date. Macedo, supra note 97, at 573; see also Helfgott, supra note 26, at 3. Critics of
first-to-file also argue that such a system would foster premature and sketchy
disclosures in hastily-filed patent applications, resulting in a decline in the quality of
applications. This argument is based on the premise that to establish an early priority

2007]

HARMONIZATION THROUGH CONDEMNATION

469

system applicants may take the time necessary to prepare a complete,
well-drafted application, without fear that by taking the time to do so
they jeopardize ownership of the patent. 119 This argument is
asserted to be of particular importance to less wealthy inventors,
such as independent inventors and small companies. Under a firstto-file system, those less wealthy inventors would be disadvantaged
by the need to file multiple patent applications as their research
proceeds, 120 but under a first-to-invent system, they have the ability
to delay the expense of patent application filing for a limited time 121

date, inventors will rush to file applications on the basis of bare concepts before the
inventions are fully developed. Critics of the first-to-file system also contend that the
Patent Office will be burdened with an increased volume of patent applications filed for
defensive purposes, many of which will contain unpatentable and inoperable
inventions. DeBari, supra note 92, at 704.
119.
DeBari, supra note 92, at 702-03.
One of the leading arguments advanced by those opposed to adopting a first-tofile priority system is that small entities would be placed at a disadvantage in
the race to the Patent Office. This result would occur because of the limited
resources available to small entities for preparing and filing patent
applications. Under the first-to-invent system, once inventors conceive an
invention, they can proceed diligently to reduce the invention to practice
without rushing to file a patent application. Even if someone else files a patent
application first, the first inventor will be entitled to the patent on the
invention.

Id.; see also Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885 (stating that "there are significant risks that
result from over-encouraging early filing'').
120.
See MAURICE H. KLITZMANN, PATENT INTERFERENCE LAW AND PRAC. XXIV
(1984) (noting that first-to-file would encourage a race to the patent office with "hasty
application drafting with limited experimental exemplification or support"); Banner,
supra note 84, at 9; Carnathan, supra note 96, at 796 (remarking that applicants may
be "forced to file continuation-in-part applications in increased numbers" under a firstto-file system); Wrenn, supra note 90, at 885 (noting a "comparative disadvantage for
smaller organizations not as proficient at identifying and prosecuting patentable
inventions"). But see 1987 Comm. Rep. A.B.A. Sec. Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. 62
(Aug. 6-12, 1987), noting:
Supposedly, first-to-invent practice allows the small inventor to reduce an
invention to practice in a diligent, but measured fashion, consistent with
limited resources, and maintain entitlement to a patent over an earlier-filed
patent application of a more resourceful, subsequent inventor. This
consideration, while theoretically and historically interesting, has little
significance in almost every practical setting.
This consideration has little practical significance because generally only well-financed
corporate parties have the resources to engage in interferences. See also Macedo,
supra note 97, at 578 (noting that advocates of the first-to-file system claim that very
few small inventors benefit from the first-to-invent system due to the high cost of
interferences).
Inventors cannot wait indefinitely without risk because of other provisions
121.
of the patent statute, known as "statutory bars." Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103
(2006), even a first inventor can lose the right to a patent if anyone, even including the
inventor, publishes an enabling description of the invention more than one year prior
to the inventor's application. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 103(g), even a first inventor can

470

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

!VOL. 40:445

while perfecting their inventions. Therefore, unless the U.S. Patent
Office hires significantly more examiners, the examination process
(already longer than the Patent Office's own targets) must become
longer or less reliable. A first-to-invent system also reduces the need
for pre-filing secrecy, a problem of particular concern to academia,
where the historical model has favored publication of scientific
advances. Finally, defenders of first-to-invent argue that the current
first-to-invent system has fueled economic competitiveness. 122
After reviewing the arguments for and against the first-to-invent
and first-to-file systems, Macedo concludes "a comparison of the
current patent system with the proposed WIPO model shows that
neither system is so much better than its rival as to justify and
outweigh the transaction costs of a change of systems." 123 While the
arguments in favor of switching are optimistic in their estimate of
advantages of the first-to-file system and appear to overlook potential
disadvantages, it cannot be said that it would be irrational to make
the switch. The question remains: How? Must the Constitution be
amended to accomplish the change, or is it possible to accommodate a
first-to-file system under the current Constitution?

II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

A. Article I, Section Eight: History and Interpretation
Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight of the Constitution, in
what is variously referred to as the Copyright Clause, the Patent
Clause, and the Intellectual Property Clause, confers on Congress the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to
Inventors the exclusive Right to
their ... Discoveries." 1 2 4
Especially given the ''broad strokes" approach of the framers, 125
it is curious that specific power relating to intellectual property made

lose the right to a patent by suppressing or concealing the invention. There are other,
more complicated forfeiture provisions, for example forfeiture for unlicensed filing of an
application abroad before filing in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 184.
122.
Taylor, supra note 92, at 528.
123.
Macedo, supra note 97, at 566.
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8.
124.
125.
In the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention: 1.
To insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government should be
clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought
to be accommodated to times and events. 2. To use simple and precise
language, and general propositions.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 137 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (quoting
Edmund Randolph). See also Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)
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it into the Constitution. Little is known about the genesis of the
Intellectual Property Clause. James Madison commented that the
"utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain, to be a right at
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason
to belong to the inventors." 126 A contemporary essay indicates that
the motivation may have been to encourage inventors and authors
without tapping the meager resources of the new federal
government. 127 Beyond that, most is speculation. 128 Some have
speculated that the clause was included solely for the purpose of
imposing limits on the power; 129 others have attributed its inclusion
to enlightenment interest in philosophy and natural rights. 1 30
Written evidence of motivation and even of parentage is simply
lacking. What little contemporary writing is available regarding the
Intellectual Property Clause is summarized in Part II(A) below.
Whether the clause sets the inner or outer limits of federal power
with respect to patents is critical to harmonization. Two questions of
interpretation arise: Does the Intellectual Property Clause authorize
first-to-file, and if not, does it forbid first-to-file? If it authorizes firstto-file, no further analysis is required; if it neither authorizes nor
forbids it, the analysis must proceed to a search for another source of
power. 131 If the Intellectual Property Clause forbids first-to-file, then
either a coequal source of power must be found 132 or the Constitution
must be amended.

(asserting that while interpreting the Constitution, it is presumed "that no word was
unnecessarily used, or needlessly added").
126.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison).
127.
Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 AMERICAN
MUSEUM OR REPOSITORY OF ANCIENT AND MODERN FuGITIVE PIECES 303 (1789) ("As to
those monopolies, which, by way of premiums, are granted for certain years to
ingenious discoveries in countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has
no resources to reward extraordinary merit.").
128.
See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science

and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the
United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 31-34 (1994).
129.
Id. at 32-33.
The unusual fact that this particular detail exists in the Intellectual Property
Clause in and of itself suggests a key to why such a clause was included. The
Clause was intended not so much as an express authority to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a means of ensuring
authority to do so in a particular way.

I d.
130.
See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
186 (1968).
131.
The Commerce Clause has been suggested as this alternate source. See
infra note 195.
The Treaty Power has been suggested as coequal with, and able to
132.
overcome, restrictions on legislative power. See infra notes 205-08.
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Heald and Sherry 133 identify six categories of historical evidence
which the Supreme Court has used in constitutional analysis: preconstitutional history, 134 drafting debates, 135 ratification debates, 136
public reactions, 137 early judicial precedent, 138 and early
congressional precedent.139
1.

Pre-Constitutional History

One of the sources of pre-constitutional authority is the common
law of England at the time of the American Revolution. The English
approach to monopolies was exemplified by the case of Darcy v.
Allein 140 and the Statute of Monopolies. 141 In Darcy, the court
invalidated a monopoly granted by Queen Elizabeth I on playing
cards, holding monopolies generally illegal and detrimental because
they raised prices, reduced the availability of goods, and reduced

133.
Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
the Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1119, 1141 (2000).
134.
According to Heald and Sherry, this includes English legal history, colonial
practices, and state practices under the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 1130-31
(citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons,
455 U.S. 457 (1982)).
Heald and Sherry again cite Alden and Railway Labor Executives'.
135.
Although, as Heald and Sherry note,
[c]onsistent with the most sophisticated literature on original intent, however,
the Court tends not to emphasize the drafters' debates. According to originalist
theory, the legitimacy of judicial review depends on the Constitution's status as
a popularly ratified document. Thus, the intent of particular drafters-mere
proponents of ideas rather than enacters ... is not as important as how the
words were popularly understood at the time. Remarks made by the drafters
can illuminate this meaning but are not necessarily dispositive.

Id. at 1132. But, the Court occasionally uses not only the debates of the drafters but
also in one case a private letter James Madison wrote some 40 years later. See West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (citing an 1829 James
Madison letter in support of the Dormant Commerce Clause). I d. at n.101.
136.
Alden, 527 U.S. 706; Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Monaco v.
Miss., 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211(1995); Heald
& Sherry, supra note 133, at 1134--35 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
137.
Id. at 1135-36 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)).
Id. at 1136 (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. 211).
138.
Early congressional precedents include the absence of congressional action
139.
as evidence that it believed it lacked constitutional authority to act. ld. at 1137 (citing
Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) ("[I]f ... earlier Congresses avoided use of this
highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that the power was thought
not to exist.")). Printz refers to the power to require state officials to assist in the
implementation of federal laws. The case addressed the Brady Bill's requirement that
local officials conduct background checks in the sale of firearms.
140.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1083 (1973) (mentioning
The Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.
1602)).
141.
Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).
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competition, although recognizing that one who ''by his own charge
and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade
into the realm whether by a truly new invention or by bringing to
England a new trade or industry known elsewhere-might usefully
receive a monopoly." 142 In 1623, Parliament enacted the Statute of
Monopolies, which codified the general common law prohibition on
monopolies expressed in Darcy but also recognized the value of
inventions and provided that the general prohibition:
[n]ot extend to any letters patent and grants of privilege for the term of
one and twenty years or under, heretofore made, of the sole working or
making of any manner of new manufacture within this realm, to the
first and true inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which
others at the time of making such letter patent and grants did not use,
so they be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state. 143

Another source of pre-constitutional authority would be the laws
of the colonies.
Colonial patents appear to have been rarely
granted 14 4 and enforced even less frequently.l 45 While most colonial
patents were granted by special act of the legislature, at least one
state, South Carolina, had a general patent statute. 146
2.

The Drafting Debates, Ratification Debates, and Early Public
Reactions

The Intellectual Property Clause was adopted without debate
and with little historical record. 147 The patent language in particular
appears to have been added in committee with no record of who made
the addition or why. 148 A number of explanations have been offered:

142.
The Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep.
1260 (K.B. 1602).
143.
Statute of Monopolies of 1623. Note that the proposal to shift from a firstto-invent system to a first-to-file system does nothing to reduce the "mischief' of
monopolies; it merely shifts it from one monopolist to another. In fact, if the data are
to be believed, the shift may well result in shifting the patent to a more powerful
monopolist.
Patents were, however, granted by the colonies and states prior to 1787.
144.
See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973) (listing five such patents).
145.
See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States
Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 615, 623-31
(1994).
"[T]he Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of
146.
making or vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same
privileges and restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books."
An Act for the Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, S.C. Public Laws 333-34 (1784).
"No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has left any record
147.
concerning the interpretation or meaning placed on the intellectual property clause by
the delegates themselves." Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early
Views on the Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995).
Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 51 ("There is no record to indicate how the
148.
intellectual property proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney were transformed
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(1) Support for the grant of patents and copyrights was
so strong and universal that neither debate nor analysis
was required. 149
(2) Patents and copyrights were so unimportant that no
one cared enough to debate or analyze the proposal. 150
(3) Patents and copyrights were non-controversial and
the Convention had more important issues to resolve. 15 1
The Intellectual Property Clause first appeared at the Constitutional
Convention 152 on August 18, 1787, when it was proposed to grant the
federal government the power "To secure to literary authors their
copy rights for a limited time; To encourage, by proper premiums and
provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries; To
grant patents for useful inventions; To secure to authors exclusive
rights for a certain time . . .. "153 The proposal was referred to the
Committee of Detaii.l 54 On August 31, 1787, the proposal had not
been acted on and was referred, along with other as yet unresolved

into this clause. Madison, as a member of the responsible committee, must have
known but never explained it. Nor did any other member of the Committee.").
149.
Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System .. . The Past is Prologue, 62 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 437, 440 (1980) (noting "[t]he delegates clearly believed firmly that it was
in the public interest to establish a patent and copyright system .... Unfortunately,
this lack of controversy and legislative history has provided later scholars with little
guidance as to the framers' original intent.").
150.
Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 16 ("One indication of the relatively low
value attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found of any litigation
involving colonial patents of monopoly for invention in any colonial or English court.").
151.
Id. at 26 ("It may well have been that the delegates were tired, wanted to
go home, and simply did not perceive this particular grant of power to the Congress to
warrant any further debate."). Furthermore,
The absence of debate over the patent provision ... has been taken as
proof of their firm belief in patents as the best way to encourage socially
beneficial innovation. However, it is more likely that the authors of the
Constitution [acted] without paying much attention to the subject, since
they were also faced with the larger problems of how to structure the
government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend the new nation.

Id. at 27 n.89 (quoting Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the
American Patent System, 71 AM. SCI. 500, 500 (1983)).
See id. at 43-50, for a detailed chronology of the development of the
152.
Intellectual Property Clause and the available historical record. Walterscheid notes
inconsistent records of who proposed the clause, even among different accounts in
Madison's notes.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 125, at 321-22; see also
153.
Kevin D. Galbraith, Forever on the Installment Plan? An Examination of the
Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders' Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119, 1140 (2002).
154.
BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW
192-93 n. 7 (1967).
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proposals, to the so-called Committee of Eleven. 155 On September 5,
1787, the Committee presented the Intellectual Property Clause in its
current form, 156 and it was approved unanimously and without
debate. 157 There does not appear to be any record of the
transformation of the language in the interim.
It has been asked why it was necessary to include an intellectual
property clause at all 158 when the philosophy of the Constitution was
"to insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and
unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times and events." 159
The power to protect intellectual property rights would appear, to
modern eyes, inherent (e.g., necessary and proper under the
Commerce Clause). One answer may be that it was not only not
viewed as inherent in 1789, but it may have been thought to be a
power denied the central government, in light of the Articles of
Confederation's implicit reservation of the right to grant patents to
the states and the lack of state laws protecting inventors. 160 It has,
however, been argued that the purpose of including the clause and its
unusual preamble was "not so much as an express authority to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, but rather as a

155.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 125, at 473 (quoting
Madison's journal entry of August 31, 1787). The Committee of Eleven comprised one
member from each state except Rhode Island and New York, which did not have
delegates present at the time.
Galbraith, supra note 153, at 1140 ("On September 5, 1787 . . . the
156.
Committee of Eleven reported back with the following language: To promote the
progress of Science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
Id. at 1140-41.
157.
On September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to the full
Convention the entire Constitution, which contained the Copyright Clause with
the language unchanged from the September 5 version. On September 17, the
Constitution was adopted and signed by the delegates, and there was no
recorded debate of the Copyright Clause.

See also Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 26.
158.
Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 26.
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 125, at 137. Early on
159.
the Supreme Court held that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect . . . ." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
Article II of the Articles of Confederation specifically reserved to the states
160.
all rights not expressly granted to the United States. No right to grant patents or
copyrights was included in Article IX. Some state constitutions explicitly prohibited
the grant of monopolies. See, e.g., MD. CONST. OF 1776, Declaration of Rights § 39
(1867) ("That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and
the principles of commerce; and ought not to be suffered."); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, A
Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII (1868) ("That perpetuities and monopolies are
contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be allowed.").
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means of ensuring authority to do so in a particular way, namely, by
securing exclusive rights for limited times." 16 1
Walterscheid's exhaustive history of the Intellectual Property
Clause identifies only one instance of discussion of the Intellectual
Property Clause during ratification: "As to those monopolies, which,
by way of premiums, are granted for certain years to ingenious
discoveries in medicine, machines, and useful arts; they are common
in all countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has no
resources to reward extraordinary merit."1 62
In the absence of any discussion or debate at the Constitutional
Convention, it is logical to assume that the term inventor was
intended to be interpreted in its ordinary, contemporary sense. The
standard dictionary of the day would have been the contemporary
Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, which defined
inventor as "a finder of something new." 163
3.

Early Judicial Precedent
The construction of the Constitution by the first act of 1790 and the
act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation,
many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of
itself entitled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the
rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of
nearly a century, it is almost conclusive. 1 64

With regard to the first-to-invent system of patent law, the period
without dispute is, of course, now more than two centuries.
Carnathan 165 argues, however, that the Constitution does not
mandate the first-to-invent system, because
[a]t the time of the framing, the term "first and true inventor" was
unquestionably not understood to mean only the creator of the
invention. On the contrary, "first and true inventor" as understood
under the English Statute of Monopolies included a person who
introduced to England an invention previously used in another
country. 166

161.
Walterscheid, supra note 128, at 33.
Id. at n.188 (citing Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal
162.
Constitution, supra note 127, at 303).
163.
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1967).
The definition is
unchanged from the first edition (1755) through the fourth edition (1773), although the
later edition deletes one example of usage from the first edition ("Th' invention all
admir'd, and each how he To be the inventor miss'd. Milton.").
164.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)
(construing copyright); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (early
congressional indication that the president has sole power to remove executive officers
supports the conclusion that the Constitution gives the president that power).
Carnathan, supra note 96, at 772.
165.
Id. at 773.
166.
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Many members of the 1790 Congress had been delegates to the
Constitutional Convention 167 and had rejected the English first-tointroduce approach (as does the current U.K. statute).I 68 This view
also finds support in early cases. 169
4.

Early Congressional Precedent

The first patent statute was enacted in the second session of the
first CongressP0 Section 1 authorized granting patents to anyone
having "invented or discovered any useful art ... not before known or
used . . .. " and Section 5 provided for repeal of patents granted to
anyone other than the first and true inventor.I 71
The second patent statute, 172 enacted in 1793, provided,
when any person ... being a citizen ... of the United States, shall
allege that he . . . [has] invented any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement of any art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a
petition to the Secretary of State, ... it shall and may be lawful for the
said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out .... 173

167.
See http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammemlhlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit
(fr003443)) for a list of Convention delegates and http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf for a list of Senators.
168.
The Patents Act of 1977 (as amended), 2007, 37 (Eng.), available at
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/patentsact1977.pdf.
The Pennsylvania Circuit Court rejected patents of importation in Reutgen
169.
v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas. 555, 556 (C.C.D. Pennsylvania 1804) (No. 11,710), charging a
jury that "if the invention was brought over [from Europe], that is, if it appears that
the plaintiff was not the original inventor, in reference to other parts of the world as
well as America, he is not entitled to a patent."). Justice Story also rejected the
English model in several cases. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 11,645); Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217); Woodcock
v. Parker, 30 F. Cas. 491, 491 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 17,971) (stating "a subsequent
inventor cannot, by obtaining a patent therefor, oust the first inventor of his
right ... notwithstanding he may have been a subsequent inventor, without any
knowledge of the prior existence of the machine .... ").
It is sufficient, that he is the first inventor, to entitle him to a patent; and no
subsequent inventor has a right to deprive him of the right to use his own prior
invention .... [I]ndeed, this has been the habitual, if not invariable,
interpretation of all our patent acts from the origin of the government.

Reed v. Cutter, 20 F. Cas at 437.
170.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
171.
ld. §§ 5, 7. Section 5 authorized an action for repeal of patent, and "if it
shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor ... judgment shall
be rendered ... for the repeal of such patent .... "
172.
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
ld. § 1.
173.
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It also required that the applicant "swear or affirm that he does verily
believe, that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the art, machine,
or improvement, for which he solicits a patent." 1 74
The 1793 statute made the first statutory provision for
administratively resolving multiple claims to the same invention. A
three person board comprised of one member appointed by the
Secretary of State and one member appointed by each of the
claimants decided entitlement to the patent.I75 The board's decision
was based on a determination of the true and first inventor. 176 While
the argument might be made that the lack of specific authority in the
original statute to resolve multiple claims is inconsistent with a belief
that the patent constitutionally belonged to the first inventor, it is
more likely that, having established the principle, there was no
perceived need to spend legislative time on an elaborate process: Only
three patents were issued in 1790. 177 The patent statute enacted in
1836 created the formal examination bureaucracy and an
administrative procedure for determining the right to a patent among
competing claimants.17 8 The current patent law likewise provides for
an examination of applications and award of patents only to the first
inventor for any given invention. 1 79
With this background, we turn to the questions: Does the
Intellectual Property Clause constrain patent enactments? Does it
authorize first-to-file? If not, does it prohibit first-to-file?

174.
ld. § 3.
175.
Id. § 1.
176.
ROBINSON, supra note 63, at 211 n.2.
177.
PATENT ACTMTY CALENDAR, supra note 64. Thirty-three patents were
issued in 1791, eleven in 1792, twenty in 1793 and twenty-two in 1794. ld. The first
year in which more than 100 patents were issued was 1808. ld. In 2004, the last year
for which data is available, 164,293 patents were issued. ld.
178.
Patent Act of 1836 ch. 357, §§ 7-8, 5 Stat. at 117, 119.
[W]henever an application shall be made for a patent which, in the
opinion of the Commissioner, would interfere with any other patent for
which an application may be pending, or with any unexpired patent
which shall have been granted, it shall be the duty of the Commissioner
to give notice thereof to such applicants, or patentees ... and if either
shall be dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner on the
question of priority of right or invention, on a hearing thereof, he may
appeal from such decision.

ld. § 8.
179.
See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text for The U.S. Patent Office's
process for resolving multiple claims to the patent on the invention, known as
interference.
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B. Does Article I, Section 8 Constrain Patent Enactments?
1.

Is the Preamble a Limitation?

Much has been made of the role of the preamble of the
Intellectual Property Clause, specifically whether it limits Congress's
power or whether it is simply eighteenth century "PR." In Graham v.
John Deere, 180 the Court held that:
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power
stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the
Congress "To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to
Inventors the exclusive Right to
their ... Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of
power and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often
exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English
Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts." It
was written against the backdrop of the practices-eventually curtailed
by the Statute of Monopolies-of the Crown in granting monopolies to
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been
enjoyed by the public .... The Congress in the exercise of the patent
power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose. 1 8 1

Likewise, in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 182 the Supreme
Court viewed the preamble as a limitation on congressional power,
holding that Congress cannot remove technology from the public
domain, because doing so would thwart the constitutional mandate to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. 183 Holbrook
concludes that the preamble is limiting, although he characterizes the
limitation as "slight." 184

180.
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Id. at 5-6.
181.
182.
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
"[A]s this Court has held, in light of the limitations built into the clause,
183.
monopolies are not permitted under the Copyright Clause when there is no
concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts."' I d. at 146.
184.

In summary, the preamble of the Patent and Copyright Clause does
provide limitations on the power of Congress to act. The limitation,
however, is slight and Congress has significant discretion in enacting
laws to affect [sic] the goal of promoting progress of the sciences and
useful arts. The other limitations of the clause, such as the limited
times provisions and the requirement that Congress not remove
anything from the public domain, contain significant restrictions on
Congress' power.

Holbrook, supra note 54, at 21.
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Does Article I Limit Patents to the First-to-Invent?

The specific question of the role of the preamble is, in fact,
irrelevant to the issue of harmonization; first-to-file, first-to-invent, or
patents of importation are all ways to further progress. Of greater
consequence is the question of whether the Intellectual Property
Clause limits patents to the first and true inventor.
Although focusing on the question of whether a harmonization
treaty might circumvent any constitutional limits on patent
legislation, Holbrook suggests that absent a lawful treaty,
inventorship is a limitation on Congress's power that would prevent
conversion to a first-to-file system.l 85 Citing the Court's observation
in McClurg v. Kingsland 186 that Congress's power to legislate with
respect to patents is plenary, Macedo concludes that "[i]n view of the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Congress' powers to enact
patent and copyright legislation, it appears that a first-to-file system
with a derivation provision would likely survive a constitutional
challenge by a disappointed patent applicant." 187
Congress's power, even if plenary, is of course still limited by the
Constitution. In both Graham v. John Deere and Bonito Boats, the
Supreme Court recognized such a limitation in general. 188 The
Supreme Court has not addressed the first inventor limitation issue
directly, but at least one circuit court case, decided after the Macedo
article, recognizes this limitation explicitly with respect to the first
inventor requirement.l89
Thus, every factor identified by Heald and Sherry argues against
the constitutionality of a first-to-file system under the Intellectual
Property Clause. The pre-constitutional authority is sparse, but what

185.
Holbrook questions whether Congress could "under the auspices of a treaty,
pass an intellectual property law that contravenes the limitations of the Patent Clause,
such as affording a patent of infinite duration" but concludes that "[g)iven that
historically the inventor has been viewed as first to create, then such tradition may
suggest a constitutionally rooted requirement that would preclude a first to file system
and thus thwart harmonization efforts." Id. at 1, 8.
McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843). "[T]he powers of Congress to
186.
legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as
there are no restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to
modify them at their pleasure." I d. at 206.
187.
Macedo, supra note 97, at 566.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141; Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383
188.
u.s. 1 (1966).
See Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d
189.
406, 408 (4th Cir. 1971) (involving the consequence of failing to name all joint
inventors, rather than a contest between competing claimants). The Fourth Circuit
held that "Because Article I, § 8 of the Constitution authorizes an exclusive right in
discoveries to inventors and none other, the law has been strictly construed to grant
patents only to the true inventors." Id. at 408.
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authority there is speaks of the rights of the first inventor.190 In the
absence of any indication to the contrary, there is no basis to assume
that the words used meant anything other than their ordinary
meanings, and the contemporary dictionary definition of inventor was
"a finder of something new." 191 The records of the constitutional
drafting debates, the ratification debates, and public reaction are
sparse. 192 Certainly the Framers were aware of the concepts of
patents of importation and monopolies as favors and chose instead to
seek approval for the power to grant exclusive rights to authors and
inventors, not importers or people who had pleased the
administration. Early judicial precedent, while interpreting statutes
rather than deciding challenges to their constitutionality, rejected
patent rights of claimants who were shown not to have been the first
and true inventors. 193 Early statutes (and in fact every patent
statute since the first Congress) granted patents only to the first-toinvent.194 In short, there is no previously recognized constitutional
basis for interpreting Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight as
enabling a first-to-file patent system in the United States.
In other contexts, it might be argued that Congress should have
the benefit of the constitutional doubt, since the Framers did not
specifically say "and patents may not be granted to anyone else," or
that the terms of the Intellectual Property Clause should be viewed in
evolutionary terms and allowed to grow to match the demands of the
international community. Here, however, the question is whether
Congress should have the power to grant monopolies condemned in
England by Darcy v. Allein and the Statute of Monopolies, odious
under Maryland colonial law, contrary to the genius of a free state
under South Carolina colonial law, and a power denied to the central
government entirely under the Articles of Confederation.
The
evolution of the last 200 years has not improved the standing of
monopolies.

C. Can Congress Overcome Section Eight Limitations Through Other
Clauses?
Two solutions for avoiding Clause Eight have been suggested:
action under the Commerce Clause and under the treaty power. The
thrust of both approaches is that, even if the Intellectual Property
Clause falls short of granting Congress the power to award patents

190.
For a discussion of The English Statute of Monopolies and the state
statutes, see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
191.
See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text.
192.
See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
193.
See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
194.

482

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

!VOL. 40:445

under a first-to-file system, it likewise falls short of forbidding it. The
challenge, then, is to find an alternate source of the necessary power.
1.

Can the Commerce Clause Overcome Section Eight Limitations?

Wrenn suggests the Commerce Clause as an alternate source of
power to establish a first-to-file patent system, although only as a
backup to the "unlikely event that the Patent Clause is held to limit
'Inventors' to those who are the first to invent."195 The Trademark
Cases held that the Intellectual Property Clause was not broad
enough to provide Congress with the power to establish a federal
trademark system since trademarks were neither inventions nor
works of authorship. 196 The argument that the requisite power was
supplied by the Commerce Clause failed for two reasons. First, the
Court found no expression of intent to act pursuant to Commerce
Clause powers in the legislative history, and second, the legislation
went beyond regulation of federal commerce (as the concept was
understood at the time). 197 Subsequently, Congress crafted a
constitutional federal trademark registration system under the
Commerce Clause, limited to federal commerce.1 98 Thus, it is logical
to look to the Commerce Clause to find power to create a patent
system that is not authorized by the Intellectual Property Clause.
Two main difficulties immediately emerge, one practical and one
theoretical. Practically, the Commerce Clause only supplies the
power to regulate federal commerce. For that reason, the Lanham
Act only regulates interstate trademarks, leaving in place fifty
intrastate trademark systems. 199 Using this power would leave open
the possibility of state patents. Given the concerns raised as to the
possibility of two patentees (one first-to-invent, one first-to-file), 200
the possibility of fifty-one patentees (one first-to-file plus one in each
of the fifty states) would be horrifying.
The theoretical problem is that, by holding the Intellectual
Property Clause inapplicable to trademarks, the Court not only
invalidated the 1879 federal trademark law, but also eliminated the
question of whether the Intellectual Property Clause placed any
limits on trademark enactments. The clause simply did not apply,

195.
Wrenn, supra note 90, at 890. "A modern analysis ... suggests that the
U.S., on balance, stands to gain by embracing [first-to-file]. Arguments that the
Constitution forbids such a change are tenable, but ultimately are not persuasive and
should not prevent action by Congress." ld. at 891.
196.
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
ld. at 97-98.
197.
198.
Trademark Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (the Lanham Trademark Act).
The current federal trademark law is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 111129, 1141 (2006).
199.
See Trademark Act of 1946, supra note 198.
200.
See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
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and therefore could not limit Congress's power in the area. The
Intellectual Property Clause does apply to patents, and therefore
whatever restrictions it places on Congress's power must also apply.
The clause is both a grant of power and a limitation .... The Congress
in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints
imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or
social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available. 201

Given the Court's interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause
as a limitation on congressional authority (rather than a mere lack of
sufficient authority), 202 the Commerce Clause cannot remove the
limitation.
2.

Can the Treaty Power Overcome Section Eight Limitations?

In 1879, the Supreme Court indirectly suggested using the treaty
power to overcome Article I limitations, when in the Trademark
Cases 203 it left "untouched the whole question of the treaty-making
power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to pass any laws
necessary to carry treaties into effect."204
In the specific context of the first-to-file debate, Holbrook
suggests that Congress, under the auspices of a treaty, might have
power to enact an intellectual property law that contravenes the
limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause, "such as affording a
patent of infinite duration," 205 but concludes that, "under the current
regime of nationally-based patent rights, the Patent Clause does limit
the authority of Congress to harmonize U.S. law with international
standards." 206 More recently, Nguyen argues that the treaty power
can be used to harmonize copyright laws beyond what would be
permitted by the Intellectual Property Clause. 207 In her view, while
the clause is ''both a grant of power and a limitation," the limitations
should be interpreted as "the outer limits of Congress' enumerated
power" and thus "do not nse to the level of affirmative

201.
Graham v. John Deere Co. ofKan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
202.
See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
203.
The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 82.
204.
Id. at 99. The Court, however, had explicitly held that trademarks were
not covered by the Intellectual Property Clause and therefore not subject to its
limitations either. Id. at 93-94.
205.
Holbrook, supra note 54, at 3.
206.
Id. at 4.
207.
See Caroline T. Nguyen, Note, Expansive Copyright Protection for All Time?
Avoiding Article I Horizontal Limitations Through the Treaty Power, 106 COL. L. REV
1079 (2005).
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prohibitions." 208 While distinctions might be argued between the
nature of limitations with respect to copyrights and patents, early
patent cases are consistent in their holdings that the Intellectual
Property Clause limits congressional power and that the limitation of
first inventorship prohibits contrary legislation. 209
The appeal of the treaty power solution is great as a practical
matter. Finding a treaty unconstitutional is a statistically uphill
battle: In 1952, Professor Sutherland could report "the Supreme
Court has never actually held either a treaty or an executive
agreement invalid." 210 The situation had not changed as of 1996,
when Henkin reported, "No provision in any treaty has been held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court," 211 and in 2001, when
Bennison could still report that "in over one hundred years of ruling
on the constitutionality of treaties the Supreme Court has
maintained ... silence as to the proper scope of the treaty power."2l2
Article II, Section Two of the Constitution grants the President
the "Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur." 213
Article VI of the Constitution provides: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land." 214 The critical question is whether the Constitution, the
laws, and the treaties are equally supreme or whether there is a
hierarchy of supremacy and, specifically, whether the Constitution is
"more supreme" than treaties. Although it would seem fundamental
that, like a statute, a treaty must be constitutional, 215 surprisingly
there is at least one Supreme Court case that has been read as
placing treaties on an equal footing with the Constitution. 216 Nowak
and Rotunda observe: "Justice Holmes suggested once [in Missouri v.
Hollanclj that this clause meant that treaties were equal to the
Constitution, even if they were not made in pursuance of it. As a

208.
Id. at 1114.
209.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text. While these cases involve
statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation, they are indicative of the intent of
the Founders. See id.
210.
Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Restricting the Treaty Power, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1305, 1319 (1952).
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 185 (Oxford
211.
Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1996).
Audrey I. Benison, International Criminal Tribunals: Is There a
212.
Substantive Limitation on the Treaty Power?, 37 STAN J. INT'L L. 75, 75 (2001).
213.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
214.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
215.
As early as 1870, the Supreme Court held that a treaty could not "change
the Constitution, or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument." Cherokee
Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 620 (1870).
216.
Mo. v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).

2007]

HARMONIZATION THROUGH CONDEMNATION

485

consequence the theory developed that treaties were not subject to
any constitutional limitations" but conclude that "[t]his view is
incorrect. As Justice Field stated, in often quoted dictum in De
Geofroy v. Riggs, the treaty power, like all other powers that the
Constitution grants, is subject to constitutionallimitations." 217
Missouri v. Holland, where Justice Holmes's suggestion appears,
clearly establishes that a treaty may provide an independent source
of congressional authority not explicitly granted by the
Constitution. 218 In 1913, Congress sought to protect migratory birds
from U.S. hunters by enacting federal legislation. 219 In U.S. v
Shauver, the legislation was held unconstitutional. 220 The United
States and Great Britain then negotiated a treaty 221 to the same
effect, and Congress enacted the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 in
furtherance of the treaty. In Missouri v. Holland, 222 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, noting that "acts of
Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so
when made under the authority of the United States," 223 and "[i]f the
treaty is valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the
[implementing] statute . . . as a necessary and proper means to
execute the power of the government." 224 The case, however, involved
a treaty provision that was not prohibited by another clause of the
Constitution, and therefore the issue whether the treaty was "valid"
in a supremacy clause sense did not arise.
Clearly, the Court could not have meant that treaties could
sweep aside the Constitution.
As Golove points out, "[t]he
Constitution does provide some guarantees to the states that could
not be withdrawn by a treaty." 225 It is unimaginable that the
president and two thirds of the Senate could abrogate the freedom of

217.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 242 (West
Group, 6th ed., 2000) (citing De Deofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (citations
omitted)).
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433----34.
218.
The Appropriation Act for the Department of Agriculture, 37 Stat. 827, 842
219.
(1913).
220.
214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
221.
The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.S.-Gr. Brit. Aug.
16, 1916, T.S. No. 628.
222.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 416.
ld. at 433.
223.
Id. at 432.
224.
David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
225.
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075,
1083 (2000). "Nor could the federal government under the auspices of a treaty wipe
away the guarantees of, for example the First, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth
Amendment." Timothy Holbrook, The Treat Power and the Patent Clause: Are There
Limits on the United States' Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 31
n.176 (2004).
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speech or religion or could repeal Article III simply by finding a treaty
partner willing to lend its name to the act. The Court acknowledged
that:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treatymaking power; but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is
obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that
a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be
assumed that, in matters requiring national action, a power which
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government is
not to be found. 226

There is a line; the Court acknowledged its existence but left its
location uncertain. The closest the Court has come to locating the
line is the plurality opinion in Reid u. Covert, 227 holding that "no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints
of the Constitution."228
Professors Heald and Sherry distinguish Holland from Reid by
noting that Reid involved a treaty which conflicted with a
constitutional provision, while Holland involved a treaty which went
beyond what was provided for in the Constitution. 229 In other words,
the analysis is similar to the determination of whether an
unexpressed power is "necessary and proper": lack of enumerated
authority differs from limitation of authority.
In the intellectual property area, lower courts have followed this
line of analysis, although reaching conflicting results. Congress
enacted an anti-bootlegging criminal statute 230 pursuant to the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) treaty.
The statute proscribed the unauthorized recording or distribution of a
live musical performance for commercial advantage or private
financial gain. Congress believed the law was within its Intellectual
Property Clause power, but the Intellectual Property Clause is
limited to "writings." In United States u. Moghadam, a defendant
was convicted under the statute. 231 The Eleventh Circuit held the
statute could not be supported by the Intellectual Property Clause
but, relying on the Trademark Cases, held that enacting the statute
was within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause,
because it was "not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation

226.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.
227.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding unconstitutional as violating
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments an executive agreement with Britain,
which purported to give U.S. military courts exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. servicemen
and their families stationed in Great Britain).
Id. at 16 (plurality opinion).
228.
Heald & Sherry, supra note 133, at 1182.
229.
230.
18 U.S.C. § 2319(a) (2006).
231.
175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. den. 529 U.S. 1036 (2000).
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requirement of the Copyright Clause." 232 In its analysis of the
question whether the Intellectual Property Clause imposed
limitations as well as granted power, the Supreme Court noted a
similar pattern in the Bankruptcy Clause. That clause had been
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n v.
Gibbons, with the Court holding that the Bankruptcy Clause power to
"establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies"
precluded enactment of non-uniform laws under the Commerce
Clause. 233
The Eleventh Circuit assumed "arguendo, without
deciding, that the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a
limitation in the Copyright Clause if the particular use of the
Commerce Clause ... were fundamentally inconsistent with the
particular limitation in the Copyright Clause . . ." 234 but concluded
that "extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical
performances is in no way inconsistent with the Copyright Clause,
even if that Clause itself does not directly authorize such
protection." 235
A New York district court reached the opposite conclusion on
similar facts.
In U.S. v. Martignon, the court dismissed an
indictment under the same statute, holding it unconstitutional as
violating two restrictions in the Intellectual Property Clause:
granting protection for a work that had not been "fixed" (and was
therefore not a "writing'') and avoiding the limited times
requirement. 236 "Congress may not sidestep the Copyright Clause's
limitations through legislating under the Commerce Clause." 237
Professor Tribe concludes that a treaty "may effectively repeal
preceding congressional legislation and preempt conflicting state
law." 238 This falls short of placing treaties on a par with the
Constitution or empowering a treaty to preempt constitutional
restrictions.

232.
Id. at 1280.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 465. The Bankruptcy Clause grants Congress the
233.
power to "establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies ..." In Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a law
directed at a particular railway, concluding that bankruptcy legislation targeted at an
individual carrier conflicted with the "uniformity" requirement of the Bankruptcy
Clause and therefore could not be enacted under the Commerce Clause. "If we were to
hold that Congress had the power to enact non-uniform bankruptcy laws pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws." I d. at 469.
Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1281.
234.
Id. at 1280.
235.
236.
346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
237.
Id. at 426.
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 4-4, at 645 (2000).
238.
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D. The Exclusivity Problem
The suggestions to use the Commerce Clause or the Treaty
Power are creative approaches to the search for alternate power.
What these approaches miss, however, is that in order to convert to
first-to-file, not only is the power to grant patents to the first filer
necessary, but the power to deny patents to the first inventor is also
necessary. Even if (1) the Intellectual Property Clause does not
forbid grants of patents under other clauses and (2) either the
Commerce Clause or the Treaty Power provides an independent
source of authority to grant patents to first filers, there is one other
provision of the Intellectual Property Clause which cannot be
avoided: the "exclusive rights . . . for limited times" provision.
Finding an alternate source of power to grant patents, unconstrained
by the inventorship requirement of the Intellectual Property Clause,
only goes half way to what is needed to convert to a first-to-file
system. In the absence of a way to deny the patent to the inventor,
granting the patent to the first filer deprives the inventor of "the
exclusive right" guaranteed by the Constitution and is therefore
unconstitutional.
E. The Constitutionality of First-to-File

In summary, when there are two claimants to a U.S. patent on
the same invention, the Constitution requires that the first inventor
be granted the patent in preference to the first individual to file an
application for the patent. 239 Harmonization, then cannot be
achieved by simply revising the patent statute to change first-toinvent to first-to-file.

III.

CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS

The goal of harmonization may, however, be achieved by other
means if it is deemed worth the price. A constitutional requirement
that U.S. patents be issued to the first inventor does not render it
impossible to harmonize international patent laws. There are at least
three possible solutions which are consistent with the U.S.
Constitution:
(1) Change the rest of the world's system to conform to
the U.S. first-to-invent system.
(2) Amend the Constitution.

239.
The first inventor must, of course, comply with the requirements of the
Patent Statute in order to obtain a patent.
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(3) Acknowledge the constitutional rights of inventors
but acquire those rights.

While arguments might be made for each of these solutions,240 only
the third appears to have any prospect for success. The first solution
is purely a question of politics and power. No provision of the U.S.
Constitution precludes harmonization by adoption of the U.S. system.
The second solution is purely a question of politics. Amending Article
I, Section Eight would not appear to require anything more than a
supermajority of Congress and the state legislatures. However strong
the arguments for harmonization, it is unlikely that they are strong
enough to support that step.
The third solution would retain the constitutionally required
first-to-invent system but transfer the acknowledged rights of
inventors where necessary for harmonization. This might be done by
voluntary transfer. A patent is assignable personal property, 241 and
therefore, the first inventor may assign it voluntarily. Unfortunately,
this solution would require the cooperation of private individuals, and
there is no reason to believe that such cooperation would be
universal.

A. Eminent Domain and its Applicability to Patents
Patents are property, 242 and the classic solution to the problem
of governmental need for personal property in the face of the owner's
reluctance to part with the property is the exercise of eminent domain
through condemnation. Eminent domain is an inherent power of
government; 243 the federal government's exercise of that inherent

240.
The first solution might be justified on the basis of economic importance of
the respective patent systems. While the United States stands alone as a first-to·
invent country, its gross national product is nearly 40% of the total of all Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. (OECD statistics for
2005
are
available
online
at
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/default.aspx?
DatasetCode=REFSERIES (last visited April 9, 2007). Thus, the argument for U.S.
compliance with the majority view is not overwhelming. The second solution might be
justified if the importance of patent harmonization ranks with religious freedom, free
speech, and due process. At this point, there does not appear to be sufficient public
sentiment to suggest that such an amendment could succeed.
241.
35 U.S.C. § 152 (2006). This section permits the grant of a patent to an
assignee. Thus, if condemnation were to take place during the application process
(rather than after issue), the patent could be issued directly to the first filer. This
would avoid some theoretical complications, such as bankruptcy of the first inventor.
242.
Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) ("A patent for
an invention is as much property as a patent for land."); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S.
183, 197 (1857) ("For, by the laws of the United States, the rights of a party under a
patent are his private property.").
243.
[I]n every political sovereign community there inheres necessarily the right and
the duty of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and promoting the
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power is limited by the Fifth Amendment. 24 4 Therefore, if it is
concluded that the purpose is sufficiently important, the federal
government can simply proceed, 245 consistent with the Fifth
Amendment, to take all patents 24 6 issued to first inventors who are
not also first filers via eminent domain, paying the first inventors just
compensation, and selling those patents to the associated first
filers. 247 As a refinement which would conserve government
resources, the system might incorporate the Japanese approach 248
(which allows the first inventor and first filer to negotiate ownership)
and require government intervention through condemnation only if
the parties fail to reach agreement. The result would be the same as

interests and welfare of the community at large. This power and this duty are
to be exerted not only in the highest acts of sovereignty, and in the external
relations of governments; they reach and comprehend likewise the interior
polity and relations of social life, which should be regulated with reference to
the advantage of the whole society. This power, denominated the eminent
domain of the state, is, as its name imports, paramount to all private rights
vested under the government, and these last are, by necessary implication, held
in subordination to this power, and must yield in every instance to its proper
exercise.
West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 531-32 (1848). See also 1A-3 JULIUS L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN§ 3.01[1-2] (Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc., 3rd ed. 2006) (1982).
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for public use,
without the owner's consent, and upon making just compensation. This
authority "springs from ... a necessity of government," and is considered to be
an essential attribute of sovereignty. Eminent domain authority is predicated
upon the superior right of the state over private property. It comes into being
with the establishment of the government and continues as long as the
government endures. Eminent domain authority does not require recognition
by constitutional provision, but exists in absolute and unlimited form.
(Footnotes omitted).
244.
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken "for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend XV.
245.
In the constitutional sense, the mechanism of calculating compensation
would involve the normal complications of establishing the value of a type of property
which is, by definition, unique and speculative. If the technology is not unique, it is not
patentable. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102.
246.
There are potential benefits to taking the patent applications rather than
the issued patent, principally avoiding the risk of the inventor's bankruptcy, but also
potential complications. Whether to take patents or applications would be a secondary
issue to be resolved.
247.
To the objection that this does not benefit the first flier since, presumably,
the price paid will be the actual value of the patent, the answer is that the purpose is
to achieve harmonization without violating the U.S. Constitution, not to benefit the
first filer; the same objection could be made to the system approved in Kelo v. City of
New London. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
248.
See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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if the United States had shifted to a first-to-file system and would
therefore satisfy the demands of the treaty.2 49
While condemnation is most often used to acquire real property,
as early as 1848 the Supreme Court was faced· with the question
whether eminent domain was limited to corporeal property and held
that intangible property rights were also subject to condemnation. 250
The power has since been used to take intangible property by
federal 251 and state 252 governments alike. 253

249.
Viewed from inside the system, several issues would need to be resolved.
Should the first filer get the patent for free or reimburse the government for its costs?
The treaty requires countries to treat domestic and foreign applicants the same, but it
does not prohibit charging different fees for different categories of application. The
United States already does so by providing a 50% discount on certain fees for certain
categories of applicants. See infra note 306. Should the process be mandatory or only
at the first filer's request? Should the first filer play any role in the condemnation
proceeding, and if not, what should the sequence be? If the government first condemns
the inventor's application but the first filer is unwilling to pay the same price, the
government will have spent time and money and deprived the inventor of property
needlessly.
250.
West River Bridge Comp. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848). Vermont's taking of a
private toll bridge was argued to be a disguised taking of the owner's contractual right
to collect tolls (granted by its charter from the state) and therefore a violation of the
Constitutional prohibition of state interference with contracts. The Court held:
[T]here can be no doubt ... that the charter of incorporation granted to the
plaintiffs in 1793, with the rights and privileges it declared or implied, formed
a contract between the plaintiffs and the State of Vermont, which the latter,
under the inhibition in the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution,
could have no power to impair.

Id. at 530. However, the Court saw no basis for restricting the power of eminent
domain to real (or tangible) property:
A distinction has been attempted, in argument, between the power of a
government to appropriate for public uses property which is corporeal ... and
the like power in the government to resume or extinguish a franchise. The
distinction thus attempted we regard as a refinement which has no foundation
in reason .... We are aware of nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class
it higher, or render it more sacred, than other property.

Id. at 534.
251.
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).
252.
States have, in effect, taken non-exclusive licenses under patents by the
indirect route of asserting immunity from suit for patent infringement under the
Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), discussed infra note 263. Note that the taking
of a non-exclusive license may also deprive the patent owner of the ability to grant an
exclusive license in the case where the owner had not previously granted any other
licenses.
Although quaere whether a state government could take a U.S. patent
253.
(rather than a non-exclusive license under the patent) through eminent domain. No
such case appears to have been reported, and there are several arguments that might
be made against the right of a state to condemn a federally granted, nationally
effective, right: the state would be seizing property that existed beyond its borders; it
would be interfering with a right granted by the federal government in furtherance of a
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As early as 1881, the Supreme Court noted in dictum that
patents were subject to eminent domain and that, although they were
grants from the federal government, it was still necessary to pay
compensation for taking a patent. 254 By statute, 255 the federal
government is, in effect, entitled to a compulsory non-exclusive
license to use any patent, subject to the patent owner's right of fair
compensation. 256 The license extends to private entities acting on
behalf of (or selling the patented invention to) the government. 257

national (not to mention constitutional) policy; and practical problems would be posed
by the possibility of multiple states pursuing the same property. The issue is beyond
the scope of this Article, and its resolution is not necessary to carry out the proposed
solution to the patent harmonization problem.
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1882), 14 Otto 356 (1882) (Plaintiff sued
254.
the postmaster of New York individually, alleging infringement of a patent in
furtherance of his official duties on a device for simultaneously canceling and
postmarking stamps; the Court expressed concern over a suit against a public official
individually but found the patent not infringed and therefore did not need to reach
either the issue of jurisdiction or of taking without compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.).
255.
28 U.S. C. § 1498(a).
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of
the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation
for such use and manufacture.
ld. This statutory right to engage in what would otherwise be infringement of a patent
has been held superior to an issued injunction against that specific act of infringement.
W.L. Gore v. Garlock, 842 F.2d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Garlock had been enjoined from
violating a Gore patent, but it petitioned for a modification of the injunction to allow it
to bid on a government subcontract.
The Federal Circuit noted that such a
modification was unnecessary since the statute provided an exception to infringement
if the activity were on behalf of the federal government; thus, use of the patented
invention for government purposes would not be infringement and would not violate
the injunction.

The government has graciously consented, in the same statute, to be sued in
the Claims Court for reasonable and entire compensation, for what would be
infringement if by a private person .... In the event Garlock becomes a sub- or
sub-sub-contractor, a gracious government has also taken care of that
possibility in the second paragraph of Section 1498(a) which reads: "For the
purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention described in
and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a subcontractor,
or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or
manufacture for the United States."
To sum it all up, Section 1498(a) gives Garlock all that it asks for in its request to order
the injunction modified and modification is therefore unnecessary.
ld. at 1283.
Calhoun v. U.S., 453 F.2d 1385 (Ct. Claims 1972).
256.
The theory underlying a patent suit in this court pursuant to that section is
that the Government, when a patented device or invention is made or used by
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The government also has the power to take an entire patent by
eminent domain. The classic example of a situation in which the
government would choose to take a patent rather than use the
compulsory license provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is that of a patent,
disclosure of which would threaten national security.
The
fundamental patent bargain involves the exchange of the inventor's
agreement that a full disclosure of how to make and use the invention
be made public 258 for the government's grant of a limited monopoly of
the use of the invention. Every application for patent is subjected to
an initial review and, in cases where the publication of the disclosure
would compromise national security, a special procedure is followed.
It begins with the issuance of a secrecy order, which among other
things, forbids filing the application abroad. 259 Examination of such
an application is conducted in a special section of the Patent Office, 260
where the application is "examined for patentability as in other cases,
but may not be passed to issue"; if it is determined that the claims of
the application are patentable, a notice of allowability is issued, 261
but since the patent may not be published, it is not issued and
therefore enforceable. Instead, the applicant's reward is a claim for
compensation in the Court of Claims 26 2 in lieu of a patent. Thus,
there is precedent for awarding a patent applicant money instead of a
patent where a compelling national interest so requires.
States can, in effect, take non-exclusive licenses to practice
patented inventions through sovereign immunity conferred by the
Eleventh Amendment. 263 In Chew v. California, the Federal Circuit

or for the United States, ipso facto takes by eminent domain a compulsory
compensable license in the patent; the patentee obtains his Fifth Amendment
just compensation for that taking through his action here under § 1498.

Id. at 1391. See also Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U.S. 290, 305, 307, 308 (1912).
257.
Note that the statute displaces the normal federal eminent domain process
and prescribes its own measure of damages. If the government initiates condemnation
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491, then Pub. L. 91-646, § 304, 84 Stat.
1894 authorizes reimbursement of "reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses,
including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees." If, instead, the
government or its contractor simply proceeds to use the patented invention without a
license, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) control. Calhoun, 453 F.2d 1385.
258.
35 U.S.C. § 212 (2006).
259.
37 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2007).
260.
This special section of the Patent Office is called ''TC Working Group 3640."
MPEP, supra note 68, at 130.
261.
Id.
262.
Hornback v. United States, 91 F.3d 152 (9th Cir. 1996); Farrand Optical v.
United States, 317 F.2d. 875 (2nd Cir. 1962).
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
263.
Savings Bank, the Supreme Court held Congress's attempt to subject the states to
liability for patent infringement unconstitutional because of a lack of evidence of a
pattern of infringing conduct on the part of the States. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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held that the Eleventh Amendment 264 shielded states from liability
for patent infringement because the patent statute, while creating
broad liability for infringement, did not contain a specific statement
of Congress's intent to abrogate state immunity and make states
liable for infringement. 265 Responding to a perceived risk that states
would use this shield to avoid liability for patent infringement and
thereby violate the Fourteenth Amendment, 266 Congress passed the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Patent
Remedy Act), to "clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and
officers and employees of States acting in their official capacity, are
subject to suit in Federal court by any person for infringement of
patents and plant variety protections." 267 In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the
state made use of a patented process for managing funds. 268 The
Supreme Court held "it is undisputed that Florida has not expressly
consented to suit" and "Congress' intent to abrogate [state immunity
from patent infringement suits] could not have been any clearer," 269
but the statute was unconstitutional since Congress failed to use
"proportionate" means 270 in response to the perceived problem.

264.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: ''The Judicial Power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
893 F.2d 331, 334 (1989).
265.
266.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part: "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. Furthermore, ''The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5.
267.
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No.
102-560, pmbl, 106 Stat. 4230 (1992); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 7, 33
(1990); S. REP. No. 102-280, at 1, 5-6 (1992). Section 271 provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the .United States any patented invention during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
Section 271(h), as amended, states: "As used in this section, the term 'whoever'
includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity," and Section 296(a)
states:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be
immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United
States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal
court by any person ... for infringement of a patent under section 271, or for
any other violation under this title.
268.
269.
270.

527 u.s. 627, 627 (1999).
Id. at 635.
Id. at 647.
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While the Florida Prepaid case involved taking a non-exclusive
license, states also have the power to take intellectual property rights
in toto. For example, in City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, the
Supreme Court of California held it improper to grant summary
judgment against the city's attempt to condemn a football franchise in
order to prevent the team from leaving the city. 271 The court found
the power of eminent domain broad enough to cover the collection of
intangible rights comprising a sports franchise. 2 72
To date, both the non-exclusive license takings and the absolute
takings have involved targeted takings for use by the government,
where there is an identifiable government need for a specific patent.
Clearing the constitutional barrier to harmonization would require
taking patents with the intent that they be transferred to third
parties and with the sole government purpose being simultaneous
compliance with the Constitution and the treaty.
B. The Challenges of Public Use and Just Compensation

Two obstacles must be overcome, both posed by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 273 The Fifth Amendment provides
that private property shall not be taken "for public use, without just
compensation." 274
The first obstacle is calculation of just
compensation. Although by definition 275 patents pose difficulties in
finding comparable sales on which to base value, courts routinely
value other unique properties (principally land) in condemnation
proceedings. The second, and more difficult, obstacle is whether the

The House Report acknowledged that "many states comply with patent law"
and could provide only two examples of patent infringement suits against the
States. See H. R. Rep., at 38. The Federal Circuit in its opinion identified only
eight patent-infringement suits prosecuted against the States in the 110 years
between 1880 and 1990. See 148 F.3d at 1353-1354. Testimony before the
House Subcommittee in favor of the bill acknowledged that "states are willing
and able to respect patent rights. The fact that there are so few reported cases
involving patent infringement claims against states underlies the point."

Id. at 640. The flaw in the Court's analysis is that, during the 110 years between 1880
and 1990, the states were immune from liability for patent infringement. If anything,
it is surprising that there were eight infringement suits prosecuted against the states.
271.
646 P.2d 835, 837 (Cal. 1982).
Id. at 840.
272.
273.
See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003)
(explaining that the Fifth Amendment requires that "the taking must be for a public
use and just compensation must be paid to the owner"); Thompson v. Consol. Gas Util.,
300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) ("[O]ne person's property may not be taken for the benefit of
another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation
be paid.").
274.
U.S. CONST. amend V.
275.
A patent will not be issued unless the claimed invention is novel and non·
obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2006).
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proposed system is "for public use," benefiting, as it will, private
entities. The development of condemnation law, primarily with
respect to takings of real estate for redevelopment purposes, indicates
that the proposal would comfortably pass constitutional muster,
particularly in light of the decision in Kelo v. New London. 276
Purely private takings, even if compensated, are prohibited by
the Takings Clause. "[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign
may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it
to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation." 277 Early cases questioned whether it would be proper
to condemn property to turn it over to another private party under
any circumstances. Justice McLean, concurring in West River Bridge
Company v. Dix, 278 opined that the government could not take the
property of one individual to transfer it to another since eminent
domain required a public purpose. 279 Modern cases, principally in the
area of urban redevelopment, view the public purpose requirement of
eminent domain broadly and permit the use of condemnation
proceedings to acquire property to be transferred to a private party in
furtherance of a governmental purpose. It is permissible to take
property from one individual (paying, of course, just compensation)
with the intention of transferring the property to another known

276.
277.

545 U.S. 469 (2005) rehearing denied, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005).
Id. at 4 78 n.5 (paraphrasing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)).

An act of the legislature ... contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority .... A
few instances will suffice to explain .... [A]law that takes property from A and
gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a
Legislature with such powers ....

ld. Accord, Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, at 245 ("A purely private
taking ... would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.").
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Neb., 164 U.S. 403, 416--17 (1896) (explaining that there must be a
genuine public purpose for the taking; a mere pretext is not enough).
278.
47 U.S. 507, 536 (1848) (Mclean, J., concurring).
279.
It is argued, that, if the State may take this bridge, it may transfer it to
other individuals, under the same or a different charter. This the State
cannot do. It would in effect be taking the property from A to convey it
to B. The public purpose for which the power is exerted must be real,
not pretended. If in the course of time the property, by a change of
circumstances, should no longer be required for public use, it may be
otherwise disposed of. But this is a case not likely to occur. The legality
of the act depends upon the facts and circumstances under which it was
done. If the use of land taken by the public for a highway should be
abandoned, it would revert to the original proprietor and owner of the
fee.

Id. at 537-38.
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individual, provided that the transfer is part of an overall plan which
has a valid public purpose. 280
The classic valid public purpose is economic redevelopment.
Berman v. Parker involved condemnation of a department store
located in a blighted area of Washington, D.C. as part of a plan for
redevelopment of the area. 28 1 The store itself was not run down, and
the owner refused to sell voluntarily. 282 The District initiated
condemnation proceedings, and the owner challenged the taking. 283
The Court held that redevelopment was a valid public purpose, and
successful development required taking all of the properties in the
area. 284 In Hawaii Housing v. Midkiff, land ownership in Hawaii was
highly concentrated in the hands of a few landowners who leased
(rather than sold) land to occupants. 285 "[T]he State and Federal
Governments owned nearly 49% of the State's land, [and] another
47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners . . . . [O]n
Oahu ... , 22 landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple titles." 286
Hawaii planned to reduce this concentration of land ownership by
condemning land owned by large land owners and transferring it to
the lessees. 287 The stated purpose was to reduce the "social and
economic evils of a land oligopoly" that "created artificial deterrents
to the normal functioning of the State's residential land market." 288
The Ninth Circuit held the plan "a naked attempt . . . to take the
property of A and transfer it to B solely for B's private use and
benefit." 289 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that
it is "only the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics" that matter;
the acquisition of the property was in furtherance of a valid public

280.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion places some limits on this power:
"The determination that a rational-basis standard of review is appropriate does
not ... alter the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored
private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by
the Public Use Clause." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490. Justice Kennedy was satisfied with the
trial court's evaluation and stated that "[t]he trial court concluded ... that benefiting
Pfizer was not the 'primary motivation or effect of this development plan; instead, the
primary motivation ... was to take advantage of Pfizer's presence."' Id. at 492. He
cautioned, however, that "[a] court confronted with a plausible accusation of
impermissible favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one
and review the record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the
government's actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose." Id. at
491.
348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954).
281.
I d.
282.
Id. at 28.
283.
Id. at 33, 36.
284.
467 u.s. 229 (1984).
285.
Id. at 232.
286.
Id. at 233.
287.
Id. at 241-42.
288.
Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 229
289.
(1984).
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purpose, and a subsequent transfer to private parties does not violate
the Constitution. 290 It is of particular interest that the land taken by
Hawaii was placed into private hands and presumably used for the
same purpose after the taking as before it was taken from the lessor
and given to the lessee.
In Kelo u. New London, the Supreme Court again reviewed a
taking of an individual's property for the purpose of transferring it to
another individual and found the practice constitutional as a public
use within the Takings Clause. 291 Kelo involved the efforts of the
City Council of New London, Connecticut, to revitalize its Fort
Trumbull area.
The clearest factual summary is in Justice
O'Connor's dissent:
Petitioners are . . . owners of 15 homes in the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood of New London, Connecticut .... Pfizer ... announced
that it would build a global research facility near the Fort Trumbull
neighborhood. Two months later, New London's city council gave
approval for the New London Development Corporation ... to prepare
the development plan at issue .... [T]he NLDC generated an ambitious
plan for redeveloping 90 acres of Fort Trumbull in order to
"complement the facility that Pfizer was planning to build, create jobs,
increase tax and other revenues, encourage public access to and use of
the city's waterfront and eventually 'build momentum' for the
revitalization of the rest of the city."292

While a portion of the area was slated for public uses, at least some
parts of the condemned land were not planned to be opened to the
general public. 293 The record before the Court contained "no
allegation that any of these properties is blighted or otherwise in poor
condition; rather, they were condemned only because they happen to
be located in the development area." 294 The city planned to transfer
the condemned land to a private developer, but at the time it initiated
condemnation, it had not chosen a particular private developer. 2 9 5 As

290.
467 U.S. at 244.
291.
545 U.S. 469 (2005). Technically, Kelo involved the constitutionality of
state action and therefore was analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment having been held inapplicable to the states directly in Barron ex. Rel.
Tiernan v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833). The transfer of patent rights from one
individual to another would need to pass constitutional muster under the Fifth
Amendment since patent rights are purely federal and the taking would be by the
federal government. However, the analysis would be precisely the same: The taking
involved in Kelo is tested using Fifth Amendment principles as applied to the state
action through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472 n.1 (citing Chi.
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)).
Id. at 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Writ of
292.
Certiorari 5).
Id. at 478 ("[T]his is not a case in which the City is planning to open the
293.
condemned land at least not in its entirety to use by the general public.").
294.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 478 n.6. As the owner of an adjacent parcel, Pfizer was expected to
295.
benefit indirectly from the development which would result from the condemnation.
The Court noted "Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often
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viewed by the O'Connor dissent, the Kelo decision "holds that the
sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private
use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new
use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the
public ...." 296 The majority held that New London's taking was part
of a "carefully considered development plan." 297 Acknowledging that
the dispositive question was whether the city's plan served a "public
purpose," the Court noted that "without exception, our cases have
defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of
deference to legislative judgments in this field."298
While most of the development of eminent domain jurisprudence
has taken place in the area of economic redevelopment, the Supreme
Court has decided a condemnation case involving intellectual
property. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. involved the EPA's use of one
applicant's trade secret data to evaluate a competitor's applications
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 299 To
obtain approval to sell a pesticide regulated under the act, companies
are required to submit information concerning the product to the EPA
for approval.3° 0 Among the information required to be submitted is
confidential information about the formulation of the product. 301 The
EPA used Monsanto's confidential data to evaluate the application of
The
a competitor, although Monsanto was compensated. 302
government argued that making use of the data reduced barriers to
entry to the pesticide market, thus increasing competition. 303 The
Court found the objective sufficient to survive constitutional
challenge. 304
The application of the condemnation cases to patent
harmonization is straightforward. Kelo allows systematic acquisition
of private property with the intent that it be redistributed to other
private parties (whose identities may be unknown at the time of the
taking), provided it is part of a plan with public benefits. Kelo
permits this even if that property is being used constructively and is
of value to its present owner. The benefits do not need to be gained
directly from the specific property that is taken, and it is not
necessary that the public have access to the taken property. Great

benefit individual private parties," and cited as examples the lessees in Midkiff and the
competitors in Monsanto. Id. at 485. In each case, the incidental private benefit was
necessary to promote the government's stated public interest. Id. at 485-86.
296.
ld. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
297.
Id. at 469 (syllabus).
298.
Id. at 480 (majority opinion).
299.
67 u.s. 986, 990 (1984).
300.
Id. at 990-91.
301.
ld. at 991.
302.
Id. at 998-1000.
303.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1020.
304.
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deference is given to the legislature's judgment on this issue. There
should be little doubt that patent harmonization is a valid public
purpose since the Supreme Court has already held that international
harmonization of intellectual property regimes is in the national
interest. 305 Therefore, should Congress decide that those few first
inventors who are not also first filers have property which must be
taken to provide the greater public benefit of patent harmonization, it
would not appear that the Supreme Court would second guess that
decision.
Details remain to be decided. Would the government absorb the
cost of the takings or would it "resell" (as in Kelo) the taken patents to
the first filers? Either approach would be consistent with Kelo. In
the first case, it would be necessary to appropriate the necessary
funds. Whether such appropriations would be wise depends on the
true value of harmonization. In the second case, to avoid further
Fifth Amendment complications it might be necessary to offer the
first filer an option whether to ''buy" the patent application or not.
Such an option system should still satisfy the requirements of WIPO,
since it is similar to the interference system already in use in Japan.
The patent would still be available to the first filer, and there would
simply be a question of whether the first filer were willing to pay the
price; the treaty is silent on the question of fees. Would the
government take patent applications or only issued patents? Either
approach would result in the patents being owned by the first filer.
Would the government initiate and administer the process as
principal, or would it instead facilitate negotiations between the
competing applicants? There may be cases in which the first filer
would voluntarily surrender the right to the patent. Since patents
are assignable personal property, it would be permissible for the first
filer to obtain the patent and sell it to the first inventor.
Alternatively, assuming the United States does not abandon its
current grace period policy, the first filer could simply withdraw the
interfering application; the result would be that the patent would be
granted to the first inventor. There does not seem to be any
principled reason for going through the process for its own sake when
the same result could be achieved by having the first filer waive the
right to the patent.
C. Reconciling Condemnation with Harmonization

Condemnation provides a method for placing patents in the
hands of the first-to-file. What remains is to determine if it also

305.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195 n.2 (2003) (finding the Copyright
Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. 302(a)-(c) (2006), constitutional).

2007]

HARMONIZATION THROUGH CONDEMNATION

501

satisfies the requirements of the proposed treaty. Several objections
might be raised.
From the public's perspective, it might be objected that the
condemnation solution would be expensive. This objection goes only
to the question of whether harmonization is worth the cost. In a
sense, it is a test of whether harmonization is good public policy: A
policy which seems good when costs are externalized may not appear
sound when all of the true costs are considered. From the first filer's
perspective, it may be objected that forcing first filers to buy the
patent is inconsistent with harmonization. Nothing in the treaty or
the Constitution requires that patent applicants receive their patents
for free; in fact, patent offices charge fees, and the U.S. Patent Office
fees depend on the nature of the applicant. 306 In addition, there is a
close precedent in the Japanese interference system. Under Article
39(2) of the Japanese Patent Act, if there are two or more claimants
to the same invention, they jointly decide who is to receive the patent.
If they fail to agree, no one gets the patent. 307 Presumably, the
parties make an economic evaluation, and the patentee compensates
the other claimants. Thus, charging a premium for a first filer who is
a later inventor could be justified. A final first filer's objection might
be that the solution treats first filers differently than first inventors.
In addition to the different treatment of different types of inventors,
the patent statute already treats different types of inventions
differently. There are, for example, different terms for utility and
plant patents (which last from the date of issue until twenty years
after the date of filing) 308 and design patents (which last for fourteen
years from date of issue). 309
The first inventor might object that the proposal reduces the
incentive to invent. Under the proposed condemnation system, the
first inventor would still receive the constitutionally required
incentive, although it would be the cash equivalent of the estimated
value of the invention. The first inventor might further object that
this is not equivalent to the constitutionally required exclusive right.
The Constitution requires an exclusive right for a "limited term." In
Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that Congress has
extremely wide latitude in setting the term. 310 If necessary, the first

306.
Small businesses, non-profit organizations, and individual inventors
receive a 50% discount on many of the fees they pay. 35 U.S.C. 41(h) (2006); 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.27 (2007); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. FY 2007 FEE SCHEDULE, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/fees/fee2007february01.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
Tokkyoho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 39, no. 2.
307.
308.
5 u.s.c. § 154 (2006).
Id. § 173.
309.
310.
537 U.S. 186, 194, 256-57 (2003) (holding constitutional an extension of a
copyright term, which Justice Breyer demonstrated in dissent, was nearly unlimited
from a discounted cash value perspective).
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inventor could be given a short period of exclusivity, which would
have little economic impact on the ultimate patentee.
From the international perspective, condemnation may appear to
offer technical harmonization without meeting the spirit of
harmonization. It does, however, accomplish the stated objectives of
the draft treaty, constrained as it is by the U.S. Constitution. If the
draft treaty would not accommodate this system, one answer would
be to rewrite the treaty, a potentially simpler task than amending the
U.S. Constitution. If harmonization is of sufficient value, presumably
this would be a reasonable price to request in exchange for changing
200 years of consistent history.
If the cost of the constitutionally sound solution is too high, one
other route of harmonization remains: other countries could
harmonize their laws to conform to the system that has produced the
strongest technological engine in the world.

